1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

stock-in-trade and monopoly of the Shi'i 'alim and mujtahid, who claimed on this basis to lead tribe and town in all secular affairs.

5. 'IRAQ SOCIETY: THE TRIBES

If elements of comparative social progress were to be found in the towns, how far did the great majority of the inhabitants outside still live in a world remote from change?—a world in which a particular range of inherited ideas, repugnances and loyalties obtained: where the manners and restrictions of urban life were unknown: where social observances, marriage and kinship, and the settlement of feuds had their traditional rules, unknown to Turkish law, and the desert virtues of hospitality and gallantry had their own interpretation. This detached specialized world surrounded, on every hand, the towns and greater villages of 'Iraq, dominated all communications, held nine-tenths of the cultivated land. The tribes, homogeneous in code and outlook and each the focus of intense loyalties, differed among themselves in important respects. Of the Arab tribes, roughly half were Sunni, half Shi'i; some, notably the Muntafiq confederation, were Shi'i with a Sunni ruling family; others contained sections of both the faiths. In Kurdistan Shi'i tribes were rare and, in places, suspected of deeper heresy. Such difference of religious allegiance was reflected in the extent to which the Shi'i tribes could be influenced by the mujtahids, and in the Sunni respect for the person of the Caliph. To the statesmen of Turkey the Shi'i sympathies of half 'Iraq were an offence and embarrassment.

The environment of the tribe affected not only its economics but its mode of life. The Kurdish nomads moved among settled folk; the desert Arabs abode in their own empty isolated world, from which arose their mental remoteness, their inaccessibility to Government forces, but also their vulnerability through dependence on the markets of the desert fringes. Such were the Dhafir of south-western 'Iraq, the 'Aniza of the Shamiya steppe, the Shammar of the upper Jazira, and smaller groups within 'Iraq. The environment of the settled cultivating tribes varied according to the irrigation method whereby they cultivated, and by the nature of their crops: the fruit or tobacco grower of Kurdistan, the wheat and vegetable grower of Samarrā were different enough from the date gardener of Ba'quba or the Shamiya, or the rice-field workers of the Albu Muḥammad or the Fatla. These folk were 'ignoble' in the eyes of the 'noble', feckless, starving aristocracy of the desert. Of the tribes of every type, the origins were at least as various as their environments, but less easy to formulate. In them all, the vital unifying and loyalty-evoking element was the name itself, and the complex of shared traditions for which it stood; but the how

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

and when of tribal identity was rarely answerable, so short is tribal memory, so vainglorious its love of legend, so vague its sense of time and place. Some tribes were, evidently, consolidated groups of mere neighbours of the same valley or river reach—Zibari or Sawamara. Others sprang from a community formed at an oasis, well, or shrine, with all the accretions, soon assimilated, which a secure livelihood would invite. In others, the bond of original kinship, retained effectively by the ruling family, had been spread wider by intermarriage within the group, and was claimed in sentiment by hundreds of loyal adopted kinsmen admitted, over centuries, from without. Historical or imagined kinship was and is, indeed, the essence of the tribal nucleus.

The size of a tribe could vary from a few tents to great confederacies embracing, with greater or lesser integration, a dozen tribes all under a single paramountcy. But of no aspect of tribal life was it, or is it, more difficult to speak precisely than of the tribe's internal organization or solidarity, or lack of these. One authority is 'under' another only by virtue of admired qualities, birth, age, and consent; and such subjection is always unstable. The Western mind is for ever puzzled by the fragility of tribal authority, upon the skill and firmness of which everything in the tribe would seem to depend.

Amid their many elements of variety, the tribes were uniform in the fundamentals of their outlook, their level stages of evolution, their common feeling of distinctness from the governed townsfolk; and their power for good or evil was enhanced by the remarkable range of personalities whom the scope of their free society allowed to emerge. Whatever the townsman of Baghdad or Mosul might feel about the wildness or avarice of his tribal fellow countrymen—whom he would reluctantly admit as such—he must needs confess the force and individuality of many of the Shaykhs: qualities found equally in a great Shaykh of desert 'Aniza or Shammar, the lord of a few sordid reed huts in the Ḥammar Lake, an Amir of the Rabi'a or Zubayd, or the Aghā of a Kurdish countryside.

For all the tumult of their restless politics and feuds, the tribes' material and social state in 1900 might well seem to an observer fundamentally unchanged for centuries. Yet in fact changes had been long at work: the same, in essence, as were moving among the town populations, and due to the same impacts of the time. The Turkish conception of government had changed, control of tribal areas had replaced mere tax-farming as the objective, modern military forces had become available. Even tribesmen could not be ignorant that Courts had been set up which at least claimed universal jurisdiction, criminals were demanded from their tribal refuges, a Mudir and his handful of *Zaptié* (*ḍhabṭiya*) could appear

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

from a headquarters no longer distant, telegraph lines could be seen, postmen rode from town to town. A dozen new townships had been founded in the last decades of the century—Naṣiriya in the Muntafiq, 'Amara in the lower Tigris, Kut and Bughayla as river-steamer fuelling points, and new-built Khans with gendarme posts along the main routes. The control of the greater canal heads had become a Government function; more and more the local Governor became the invoked arbiter of tribal quarrels; and the Tapu land records with their registration of communal tribal lands as the private property of the Shaykhs had introduced a new and jarring relationship of landlord and tenant to mar that of chieftain and loyal follower.

Other and less obvious elements were at work to modify the old tribal isolation. Increased awareness of the outside world came with the visits of grain-buying merchants' agents, since the steamship had made bulk export possible. The effects of shipping itself radiated inland from Baṣra and from the Tigris steamboats. European manufactured goods penetrated into every tribe; and the buyers, the effendis, the *Zaptié* and the city populace whom a tribesman might rarely visit, were themselves reflectors, in their kind and degree, of a faint light of Western innovation in the world of speech, ideas, and comparisons. Few of the foreign travellers of the 'nineties failed to comment on the social progress of the last quarter-century and on the greater penetration by Government of the outlying regions.

The Dhafir in the south-western desert, astride the route into Najd, lived on bad terms with ibn Rashid and raided the Muṭayr and 'Aniza. The 'Aniza, greatest of nomadic groups of northern Arabia, held the Shamiya desert from Najf to Hit. Their chief, ibn Hadhdhal, titular Qa'immaqam of Razaza, now courted and now imprisoned by the Turks, pursued his ancient feuds with the Shammar, and flouted the Government. The Dulaym were by 1900 largely settled and in part disciplined by the chain of police posts along the Aleppo road.

The Shammar had long passed their great days of formidable unity. Intermittently at war with an outstanding personality of the time, Ibrahim Pasha of the Milli Kurds—bandit, patriarch, general of Ḥamidiya, protégé of Sultan 'Abd al-Ḥamid—they were bitterly divided by factions among the sons of Farḥan Pasha, and could play off the authority of Mosul against Dayr al-Zur, loot the river traffic, withhold their taxes, and alternately court and reject the favours of Government.

On the lower Euphrates the power of the Sa'dun overlords over a complex of Shi'i tribes was in division and decline. For a generation two separate schools of leadership had appeared: the attempt

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

of Naṣir Pasha and later of his son Faliḥ to turn the tribesmen into docile tenants on the Sa'dun estates (which Ottoman land-registration policy had demarcated and bestowed under the feet of the age-long cultivators), and the attempt of Manṣur Pasha and later of his son, Sa'dun, to maintain all their old independence. Thus personal ambition and hatred joined with a clear issue of policy, with Government playing a rôle of vacillating opportunism. Year after year tribal war went on, with Turkish forces sometimes participating; civil government was almost wholly inoperative; yet settlement and tribe-breaking were all the time half-visibly proceeding. The day of a quiet tithe-paying Muntafiq peasantry was still distant; the fear of a united Muntafiq army was long past.

The middle-Euphrates tribes present for this period a confused picture of intricate local history. Typical of them are the Bani Ḥuchaym (Ḥukaym), the Shibil, Fatla, Khaza'il, Bani Ḥasan, and the tribes of 'Afak and Daghara, most of whom had been lately converted to Shi'ism and fell thereby under Mujtahid influence. Their records for the later nineteenth century show the increasing settlement of their shepherd sections, and the gradual introduction of rapacious yet feeble Turkish tax-gatherers. They show the endless bickering between tribes, accompanied by the bluster, looting, and unaimed rifle-fire which passes for tribal warfare; and the bitterer strife for the vacant headship of tribes, in which Mudir or Qa'immaqam would interfere when he could. In spite of the rare emergence of a unifying leader, the tendency was towards levelling, division, disunity. This was aided by the spread of the new land-registry system and by the purchase of whole estates by the Saniya Administration which could develop its lands without tribal agency. The shifting of the Euphrates waters from the eastern to the western channel (p. 32) had profound effects in displacing the tribes, led to clashes, secessions, and invasions, and added to the immediate authority of Government as the only possible controller of Euphrates waters.

On the lower Tigris the close of the century was stormy with civil war. With lesser marsh tribes and the new non-tribal townships, the dominant groups were those of the camel-owning, grain-growing Bani Lam and the rice-growing Albu Muḥammad. The prosperity of both tribes depended on the Government allotment of the *muqaṭa'as*,[1] whose periodical distribution led to bitter quarrelling. To the normal causes of tribal war was thus added a perpetual irritant, and to its normal practices that of preying on the Tigris river traffic. Armed attacks on this were a common

[1] The *muqaṭa'a* was (and is) a defined area (in some cases of great extent and productive value) of irrigable land, leased for a cash annual rent to a tribal shaykh; possession of a better *muqaṭa'a* was an object of the keenest rivalry.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

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feature of 'Amara life, involving *Zaptié* escorts on the paddle-boats, protests to the Wali, telegrams to London by the Lynch managers, and punitive expeditions, often unsuccessful. Shaykh Bunaya was by wealth and guile paramount in the Bani Lam for twenty years, till his death in 1903. Power among the Albu Muḥammad lay, subject to endless rivalries, in the ruling house of Khalifa.

The central Tigris groups of the Rabi'a and Zubayd had outlived their days of united insurgence. They were fully settled since the mid-century, and the Zubayd had suffered the secession of large elements to the Ḥilla district. The growth of the steamer-fuelling townships—'Aziziya, Ṣuwayra, Bughayla, and Kut itself—had brought a measure of Government control and economic opportunity.

Across the Jabal Ḥamrin in the submontane region of Mosul wilaya, Government had at all times been relatively strong and the tribes—Bayat, Da'udiya, Diza'i—in general unaggressive if pettily lawless. In the higher foothills and the true mountain country of the southern and central Kurds, which included wide patches of non-tribal territory, dwelt under their hereditary Aghās such strong communities as the Zangana, Jabbari, Ṭalabani, Shaykh Bizayni, Girdi, Surchi, Khushnau, Piran, Pishdar, Baradost, and a score of lesser names. These, generally homogeneous in speech and habit, were well armed and mounted, proud of their traditions, not unprosperous, suspicious or scornful of Turkish pretension; and the authority of their Aghās far exceeded that of the unhappy Mudir or Qa'immaqam sent to govern them. Their lawless self-centred life was still that of a millennium of ungoverned valley lordship; Turkish claims were in great part unenforceable, and strife endemic; yet the penetration of more modern ways had been for fifty years insistent, and with many a local setback and humiliation continued to gain ground.

Turkish control, at its best in the accessible flatter lands, was at its feeblest, to vanishing point, in the mountains. The Hamawand of Bazyan district, most famous of robber tribes, had raided as far afield as Russian territory, terrorized the Kirkuk countryside, returned intact from distant banishment, and lived on varying terms with the venerated Barzinji Sayids. The Jaf, with settled sections in Persia and the Gul'anbar Plain, were still nomadic between the two countries. Under united leadership—that of Maḥmud Pasha over the nomads and his brother 'Uthman Pasha in Ḥalabja, which he and his emancipated Persian wife 'Adila Khanim had largely built and wholly controlled—they could defy Government, refuse taxation, uproot telegraph lines, and recall the ways of the ancient Dere Beys. Attitudes no more amenable prevailed in the frontier territory of the Pishdar, who since 1893, when

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

a Turkish expedition first penetrated to their fastnesses, had been formed on paper into a qadhā of their own, with their Aghā irreplaceable as Qa'immaqam. The nomadic Harki passed annually across the Persian frontier, to the ruin of all settled folk in their path. Equally disastrous as neighbour or subject, and as ready to cross into Persia, was the oppressive restless Shaykh of Barzan, the religious prestige of whose family had attracted and settled a 'tribe' across the Zab from the Zibar country. Within the northern frontier of Mosul wilaya lay settled tribes, largely of the Ḥakkari group. They included the Shirwan, Mizuri, and Barwari groups. The folk of the tribeless 'Amadiya villages were reckoned also as of Ḥakkari stock.

6. RESOURCES AND COMMUNICATIONS

Many or most of the miseries of the 'Iraq of 1900 were due, it has been seen, to a single cause: the all-pervading poverty of the country and its Government. How then, in a territory famed of old for its wealth, were the modern 'Iraqis—and their Government—in fact gaining so poor a living?

The mineral resources of the wilayas were of the slightest. Building stone in the north, fullers' earth, some sulphur, salt, some low-grade 'coal' and gypsum: these were of some domestic use, but none provided wares for export. More significant were the seepages of mineral oil at many places in northern 'Iraq. At Hit on the Euphrates the bitumen outcrops had been worked since remote antiquity, and still gave material for the local industry of boat and coracle building. At Qaiyara and at Ṭuz Khurmatu the Saniya Administration owned outcrops of liquid petroleum, and exploited them by devices of comical primitiveness. At Kirkuk the seepages of Baba Gurgur belonged by ancient Firman to the Naftchi family. For those north of Mandali (which are those today exploited at Naftkhana), a refining plant had been erected at Ba'quba in 1871, but the project languished and failed. Applications by Europeans to exploit this and the Qaiyara oil were refused; but German experts had visited 'Iraq in 1871, and samples had been sent to London. The oil rights of the wilayas had been transferred, significantly, from the Finance Ministry to the Sultan's privy purse in 1889.

Local industry was insignificant and almost all unmechanized. There was some silk weaving at Baghdad and the smaller towns, some weaving of cotton and woollen cloths, rough mats and rugs. Jewellers' work was poor in quality, save for the curious antimony-on-silver "Amara work' of the Sabaeans. Finer work of Persian craftsmen in wood and ivory, and the kettles of the Baghdad coppersmiths, supplied local needs. Bright-coloured tiles were

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

If it was at times urged forward by its few modernists and by the example of the local minorities, it was retarded by retrograde self-interested elements in 'Iraqi as in Turkish society. Above all, 'Balik Başdan Kokar'—the fish putrefies from its head downwards: 'Iraq was but part of an Empire whose central government in 1900 was an inept and seedy despotism distracted by constant alarms and suspicions, lectured by the Powers, preyed on by adventurers, working by spies and tale-bearers, and rotten with corruption and nepotism. There was at Sublime Porte and Yildiz alike more willingness to gain time and weaken opposition by playing off rival forces, bribing the dangerous and reassuring with false promises, than to initiate clean and effective government, of which even the ideal as well as all the material means were lacking. From this central government the 'Iraq wilayas depended, from its ranks came the senior officials to every sanjaq and department, and to it the intriguers and malcontents of 'Iraq could bear their tales.

Economically, as has been seen, great hopes had been formed of 'Iraq development. Politically, it was the Sultan's way to woo the important town families—and notably those of religious pretension—by favours and courtesies: to encourage Sunni shrines and charities: to stress the Caliphate aspect of his rule: to be known as planning a railway to Mecca and Madina: to increase pan-Islamic preaching to align Arab with Turk: and to retain an Arab personal bodyguard. Towards its tribal problem the policy was that to which any government must sooner or later have been driven: in the impossibility of finding tribal elements capable of loyal vassaldom, and the certainty that the shaykhs would always abuse all power permitted to them, it could only be a policy of the introduction of direct rule by practicable stages. But such a project was resisted by nine-tenths of the tribal leaders, because it was fatal to their own favoured position; its enforcement therefore involved a ceaseless struggle by Government to assert its paramountcy and to drive the shaykhs to acquiescence. The varying character of Governors and the poverty of their resources led to many inconsistencies, nor was it always possible to make military demonstrations or launch successful punitive columns. It seemed at times more politic to overlook flagrant offence, to support a paramount shaykh or even to name him (as had happened) Governor of the sanjaq itself; and sometimes the shaykh could, in defiance of all policy, buy his requirements of authority or impunity for cash. 'The sword—and the sugar!' was the Turkish administrator's formula for 'Iraq.

As to politics, under the Ḥamidiyan régime political life could not be expected. It was precluded by the static and alien nature of Government, and by the pervasive spy system. Towards the Turkish Government as a whole there could be no 'Iraqi attitude

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

439 still divided between the British and the local Jewish firms. Of the former, those with offices at Baṣra in 1914 were Messrs. Lynch, Gray Mackenzie, Strick, and the Basra Trading Company, with the American firm of MacAndrew Forbes handling liquorice. At Baghdad British firms were Lynch, Blockey Cree, and Sassoon of Bombay. Attempts were twice made by an Englishman to found [453] a tailoring business. The Imperial Ottoman Bank had branches at Baghdad and Baṣra under French or Anglo-French control; the Imperial Bank of Persia appeared, only to disappear again as being unwelcome (to its rivals) in Turkish territory; the Eastern Bank opened in Baghdad in 1912. The local currency remained stable, paper money still unknown, and exchanges predictable. Much damage to trade was done by Walis' unwise instructions in the direction of price control and of prohibition on the export of foodstuffs in the supposed interests of 'Iraqi consumers. Nothing stopped shameless hoarding by the rich in years of scarcity.

369 178 579 Outside the towns and placid suburban areas the picture of tribal near-anarchy painted by foreign travellers and residents in the 'Iraq of 1900 to 1914 is a painful one. But though it is true that standards of security were low, lawless episodes despairingly repeated, and Government forces never adequate, conditions had been much worse in the past. The many new townships and police posts, increasing traffic, wider cultivation, and (for better or worse) greater Government penetration showed substantial advance from the conditions of the previous century. It was in part misleading that quicker communication tended to ventilate throughout the country episodes formerly of mere local interest. Standards, too, with the Europeanization of Government and the increased foreign interests, had become more exacting: the activities of raiders or bandits were counted scandalous where, years ago, they had passed as normal and unremarked. The tribes were more subdivided and thus weakened; resistance to Government by a united tribe was ever rarer. The shaykhs increasingly became involved in town life and politics, and Government decreasingly willing to close its eyes to tribal disobedience; direct administration was the order of the day, and for every day and place in which tribal violence was reported there were long periods and wide spaces of calm.

619 721 The Shammar, torn by their own rivalries and at perpetual feud with the Milli and 'Aniza, presented until 1909 the complete picture of desert restlessness. Thereafter, the fall and death of Ibrahim Pasha Milli redressed the balance in Shammar favour; the Milli disappeared as a formidable unit, the northern 'Aniza alone disputed Shammar ascendancy. But their successful robberies did little to strengthen the tribe, whose official shaykh the Turks changed annually; and an outbreak of fighting with the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1918-1968) MRF Iraq MH1

Dulaym in 1909 brought columns under Muḥammad Fadhil Pasha against them. Two years later a settlement with the tribe was reached by Nadhim Pasha's chief of staff, Ḥasan Ridhā Bey, accompanied as usual by recovery of loot and oaths of obedience. But the new order did not long survive; outrages on the roads recommenced, strife and rivalry for the proud and lucrative shaykhship persisted.

The Dulaym, all-powerful from 'Ana to Faluja, gave little trouble to Government or to travellers after the accession of the stalwart 'Ali Sulayman to shaykhship in 1903. New Khans were built along the route—al-Qa'im in 1907, Khan Baghdadi in 1908. Episodes of disorder in 1909 were followed by one of Nadhim Pasha's negotiated settlements; the region was one in which evident advance had been made by Government in the last generation.

The far-flung 'Aniza underwent no visible change. The two groups of the 'Amarat, with ibn Mijlad the resentful rival of ibn Hadhdhal, remained on bad terms, and raids against ibn Rashid in Najd, against Kurdish villagers in the northernmost Jazira, and against the Euphrates tribes show the range of 'Aniza activity. Fahad ibn Hadhdhal, Shaykh of the Jabal section of the 'Amarat, was still in 1914 nominal Qa'immaqam of Razaza.

Conditions in the lower Delta were as bad as Turkish 'Iraq could show. The tribes of the Ḥilla and Hindiya rivers, profoundly disturbed by the changes in the river levels elsewhere described, showed all the lawlessness of a society unpenetrated by modern communications and unstable in its loyalties as between Government, tribalism, and a reactionary priesthood. The feuds of tribe against tribe furnished sometimes the occasion for a Turkish military intervention, not rarely a fiasco and capable of dragging on into months of war. Passing through these territories was risky for the wayfarer, and the German professors digging at Babylon felt themselves to be surrounded by anarchy. On the lower Tigris the period perpetuated the internecine shaykhly struggles within both the Bani Lam and Albu Muḥammad, with rivals' appeals for Turkish aid and on occasion for British 'protection'; rare but bloody interventions by Turkish troops could not end the recurrent wars between the two tribes, with their volleys of cross-river shooting and refuge sought by the Albu Muḥammad shaykhs at Muḥammara. Interruption of the river steamers by these conditions reached its height in 1908. Nadhim Pasha in 1911 attempted a pacification; but the causes of unrest were too deep for easy removal and the outbreak of world war in 1914 found the two tribe-groups still bitterly hostile, while the outstanding personalities in each, rivals for paramountcy, still led irreconcilable factions in their remote rice-swamps and on Tigris-side.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

619 721 The lower Euphrates country of the Muntafiq owed little during these years to Turkish administration. The record of the time is of strife and intrigue connected, to a remarkable degree, with the personalities of the wilaya capital. From 1900 until 1908 the allegiance of the tribe was divided between Sa'dun Pasha and Falih Pasha, the former as heir to his father's policy of resistance to Turkish pretension, the latter inclined to Ottoman service. Turkish military intervention led to a remembered massacre of their troops at Shaṭra in 1904; but the author, Sa'dun Pasha, found pardon and a way to Government favour by ostentatious backing of the C.U.P. Supported in 1910 by Nadhim Pasha, Sa'dun by his oppression involved himself in a general revolt of the tribesmen, followed by the visit of a Turkish commission of inquiry which led to a reversal of policy against him. Military operations ensued for the hundredth time. Sa'dun himself was decoyed on board a gunboat at Baṣra and sent in exile to Aleppo, there to die in suspicious circumstances. This gave the signal for a general rallying of the Muntafiq to his gallant but shallow and unstable son, 'Ujaymi, who succeeded to the precarious headship of a tribe from which unity and loyalty had been by now for ever banished. This alignment of forces on the lower Euphrates remained, not without sudden and bloody vicissitudes, until 1914. The temporary eclipse of the C.U.P. late in 1912 led to the outlawing of 'Ujaymi and the brief ascendancy of the sons of Falih. But the tide turned; 'Ujaymi was again recognized as paramount, could again lead Muntafiq forces against the Dhafir, support the Amir of Ḥa'il, and create panic in Baṣra. The outbreak of war found him encamped near Zubayr, menacing but undecided.

619 721 423 Areas of maximum unsettlement were not only those by their terrain the least accessible to Government and to the penetration of modern forces, but those also where a fair economic background was precluded by a vicious system of landholding. The annual reallotment of the *muqaṭa'as* in 'Amara sanjaq, with its many examples of Turkish clumsiness and venality: the unreal and tribally repugnant landlord-tenant relationship in the Muntafiq: the tangle of rights or claims in the Shamiya and Hindiya areas as between the Sayid families, the heads of warring tribes and the absentee Baghdadi tapu-owners: in these lay the roots of a profound social uneasiness which provided the Turks and their successors with the most baffling and costly of their problems.

619 Central 'Iraq outside the Diwaniya sanjaq had little tribal history from 1900 to 1914. The Rabi'a were settled and accessible, the Zubayd reduced by secession and no longer bellicose, the fragmented tribes of the Diyalā and upper Tigris calling at most for occasional police action. These were areas where living stood at,

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

or just above, a fair subsistence level, taxation was not too irregularly collected, and Baghdadi landlords could make some show of administering their estates. 619

In the Persian border areas of Badra, Mandali, and Khaniqin, distracted as they were at times by trans-frontier disturbance and bickering, these parochial troubles were no general menace to peace. The submontane Kurdish areas of Mosul wilaya passed a half-generation of comparative peace and the slow decay of tribalism. Feuds between rival Aghās or occasional raiding parties of the 'young bloods' need call for no more than a patrol of *Zaptié* or a half-company of the local garrison. In the mountains the case was otherwise. All the elements of a tradition of brigandage, difficult terrain, easy crossings to Persia, and Kurdish resentment of increasing Turkish pretension combined to maintain areas of aggressive independence. The chief of these were those of the Hamawand, the Jaf, and the Barzan tribesmen. The Hamawand during these years more than confirmed their position as a pestilent affliction to all society but their own. With intervals of quietness, their young tribesmen continued to prefer raiding to the dull virtues of cultivation, and for months on end flouted Government orders, grossly insulted Turkish officials, refused to pay revenue, and terrorized the roads. In 1908 their condition of revolt became chronic, and the years following were passed in resistance to, or in eluding, military expeditions which brought no laurels to the Turkish generals. In 1910 a number of the lesser Hamawand Aghās were pardoned; but the truce was brief, their forces besieged Chamchamal, and wider disorders were prevented only by a face-saving settlement by Nadhim Pasha. It lasted for two years. From 1912 to the mid-summer of 1914 conditions in the Bazyan and Qaradagh areas were intermittently as bad as ever, and the passage of most of their tribal force into Persia added there to the confusion in the area of Salar al-Dawla's occupation (p. 72). 619 721

The Jaf were less savage but scarcely more amenable than the Hamawand. The death of 'Uthman Pasha in 1910 did not diminish Jaf supremacy in Halabja, which 'Adila Khanim continued to administer; Turkish interference was not permitted, despite the harmless presence of a Qa'immaqam. The nomadic sections under Mahmud Pasha—accounted in Baghdad as the greatest of Kurdish chieftains, though in person an insignificant, spectacled figure—had no outside contacts save with the settled folk through whose villages they passed, dreaded and unwelcome. The Pasha, after spending months in Mosul arranging the revenue-assessments on his tribe, visited Baghdad in 1911 to be lionized by Nadhim Pasha. Jaf forces were among those fighting in western Kirmanshah in 1912. The period closed without suggesting a *modus vivendi* as

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

619 721 between Turkish claims to govern and Jaf adherence to their traditional way of life.

The religious Shaykh of Barzan, true latter-day Dere Bey, still held his inaccessible and lawless court across the Greater Zab from the Zibari country. He failed regularly to render to Government even the demanded minimum of respect, and annually embroiled himself with the savage Harki in their migrations. The dispatch of Turkish forces was met by mere retirement to the higher mountains, and the authorities' use of the Harki as agents of punishment was dangerous. Conditions worsened with the half-crazy oppression and Christian-baiting of the young Shaykh, 'Abd al-Salim, who succeeded in 1908; an expedition of Muhammad Fadhil Pasha was inconclusive; and it was left to Nadhim again prudently to accept the Shaykh's excuses and restore him to a short-lived favour. He was again outlawed in 1911 and 1912, crossed to Urmiya to join the Russians, and from there survived major operations against his tribesmen in 1913 and 1914.

Rival of the Barzani Shaykh dwelt, across the Van border, the equally holy and not less tyrannous lord of Shamdinan, Shaykh Ṣadiq of Neri. His brother, 'Abd al-Qadir, was high in the politics of Istanbul; he himself, detested for his greed and cruelty, lived on robbery and the odour of sanctity, reduced his Christian villagers to serfdom, murdered a bishop, and escaped all but occasional chastisement by Turkish armies. His death in 1911 brought Shaykh 'Abd al-Qadir hotfoot to claim the inheritance, in vain. Shaykh Ṣadiq's son, Sayid Ṭaha, famed for his obesity, made good his succession and consolidated his family's position on both sides of the Turco-Persian border.

563 In the heart of Hakkari country the Assyrian clans still held their own, still attracted the interest of Protestant Europe. Benjamin, a weak unenterprising Mar Sham'un, succeeded in 1903 to the harassed patriarchate and headship of the Millet. Supported by the loyalty and hardihood of his people and notably that of his cultured and resolute sister, Surma, he was yet assailed by the intrigues of jealous cousins and by Turkish suspicions of disaffection. The Archbishop of Canterbury's mission, based on Urmiya and later also on Mosul, could do something for the spiritual, nothing for the temporal standing of the community. The protection offered by Russia at Urmiya was, as the event proved, neither a reliable standby in trouble nor acceptable to the Wali of Van; yet the Assyrians in their plight were ready to turn anywhere for support, and must have turned ever more definitely to the Russians had not war come to apply to their problem the most terrible of solutions.

619 The grim Yazidis gained some ground during this period

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

towards equality of treatment. Their own savagery had been in part tamed by the severities of the 'nineties, and their shrine of Shaykh 'Adi was restored to them in 1907. Their Mir retained his authority and the friendless community their half-secret cult and practices; but there were signs of closer Government penetration after 1909. The application of conscription produced armed resistance in 1913, but a corrective visit of Turkish troops was not seriously opposed.

4. PROJECTS, BY LAND AND WATER

Far away from shabby, backward, and turbulent 'Iraq, Baghdad Railway negotiations vitally affecting it continued as the century opened. The results reached between the Deutsche Bank, the Anatolian Railways, and the Turkish Government were contained in the Royal Irada of January 1902. This, re-cast in March 1903, revealed that the Germans had obtained excellent terms. A railway was to be built from Konia to the Persian Gulf, branches within 'Iraq were envisaged, financial provisions were generous, and a new Turkish company, the Imperial Ottoman Baghdad Railway Company, was to be formed.

The publication of the concession excited world-wide interest. The French, who in 1899 had agreed in principle to participate, now showed little enthusiasm. British co-operation was eagerly sought by the German promoters; but opinion in London, formerly indifferent or favourable to the project, was shocked now at the threat to India and to British interests in 'Iraq and the Gulf. The tide of opinion turned decisively against it, and Mr. Balfour was compelled, unwillingly, to announce British abstention. The Germans were bitterly disappointed. In Turkey itself the scheme had many critics; others favoured the project as one of hopeful development far beyond unaided Turkish capacity. In 'Iraq awareness of the enterprise grew slowly, and the same two bodies of opinion declared themselves: the one welcomed progress in any guise, the other dreaded foreign and Christian penetration.

The section Konia–Eregli was finished by October 1904 and the line prolonged to Bulgurlu, where it halted until 1909. In 1914 the Amanus tunnel was begun, the Euphrates bridged, and earth-work was proceeding towards Ras al-'Ayn. In the meanwhile other railway schemes had been propounded: a British line to run by Port Said, 'Aqaba, and Jawf to Baṣra, a French line to pass by Homs, Palmyra, and Dayr al-Zur to Baghdad and Mosul. Both were rejected by the Ottoman Government. German attempts to secure British support for their Bagdadbahn continued, only to be met by the reply, given in 1907, that opposition would cease if and when a Baghdad–Baṣra line was under all-British construction.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

III

WAR AND BRITISH OCCUPATION

I. MIDSUMMER 1914

Too few countries in the world were greater changes brought by the events of 1914 to 1918 than to 'Iraq. Severed from the Ottoman Empire after four centuries, it witnessed a change of overlord, from Oriental Muslim to Western Christian: a profoundly different spirit and effectiveness in its administration: the admission of vastly strengthened modernizing influences in society and politics, with new economic opportunities; a changed world orientation, with a transformed status and fresh problems in world affairs: and the entry of a flood of the light of European publicity and detailed familiarity with its peoples, places, and conditions. With all this, the more backward parts of its population—and these formed the great majority—were to pursue lives relatively unaltered, while the profounder problems of 'Iraqi economics and politics continued to lack solutions which, more than a generation later, have not yet been devised.

The moment from which these unforeseen and unforeseeable innovations were to date invites, therefore, certain speculations involving the comparison of fact with might-have-been.

The position reached by the 'Iraqi people and their Government by midsummer 1914 was one whose evils of insecurity, backwardness, and poverty were plain to see, and have been sufficiently described. But there were, less obviously, fair grounds also for some optimism. If the tribes had evolved little, urban society was clearly advancing under influences of relative enlightenment or modernity which seemed on balance beneficent. In politics, confined as they were to a small minority, Arab nationalism had taken a firm hold and would certainly persist; to all its varying votaries it was exciting, new, significant; and the linking of the movement in 'Iraq with those of Syria and Egypt had well begun. Such nationalism did not preclude the survival, in a high proportion of the old Sunni families and the Ottomanized bureaucracy, of pro-Turkish sentiment loyal to the ancient ways.

Nationalism apart, there were powerful elements in 'Iraq hostile to Government as such. These were certain to resist its greater efficiency, by whomsoever developed. The tribes had barely glimpsed the possibility of a rule which could provide them with irrigation water, secure their markets, stop bloodshed amongst them, heal their sick; more generally the Dawla remained the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

distant, hated, interfering bugbear and, to the shaykhs, the enemy whose every advance must be at the cost of their power and livelihood. This was no less true among the Kurds, who, hating the Turks, were unlikely to welcome the substitution of Arabs as rulers; indeed, a national consciousness of their own had already come, feebly, to birth. And on the Euphrates the theocratic Shi'i priesthood were likely under any régime to maintain their own pretensions, incompatible as these were with any secular Government. Nevertheless, the tendency of the period prior to 1914 had been on the whole towards extension of the authority of Government, a process likely or certain to continue under the newer-fashioned post-1909 Administration: for this, tactless and over-centralizing, was nevertheless more vital and more modern-minded than any previous Ottoman Government. Its administrative record even in the excessively embarrassed period of 1908 to 1914 contained creditable features: better attention was being paid to education, health services, town planning; the gendarmerie had been improved, town police perfected, the Army reorganized, the judicial system in part revised. And the international agreements of 1913 and 1914 between Turkey, Great Britain, and Germany seemed to clear away many obstacles to development.

In the latter field, indeed, there was room for fair hopes. Though many problems were untackled—those of improved agriculture, use of water resources, land tenure—yet a notable beginning had been made with irrigation works, and the Baghdad Railway was at last, it seemed, to be completed. River navigation was likely to be improved under the 1913 arrangements. The eventual opening up of productive areas and markets would encourage trade and agriculture, and perhaps create industry. A concession for the oil of Baghdad and Mosul wilayas had been promised, and that to parties well able to develop that wealth, if it existed.

Thus a prudent observer of 'Iraq in the midsummer of 1914 might have prophesied a future of increasing development of resources and communications. These, directed by a vigorous Government free at last from international strife, might have produced by degrees the wealth necessary to maintain stronger forces, to impose security, to pay an improving civil service, to remedy, in fact, the more glaring evils of the Administration. Society would almost inevitably progress towards higher standards. The movement of local nationalism was likely to gain further ground in the direction of a privileged, even an autonomous, status in the Empire; but a complete secession of the Arab provinces was unlikely because it was backed neither by any military force, nor by any especial sympathy of Europe such as the Balkan Christians had enjoyed, nor by any unity of aim among the Arabs.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

a popular illiteracy still nearly universal; these included an Islamic Benevolent Society, a Cultural League, and a number of literary clubs.

Tribal life in these months passed through a generally tranquil period. Inveterate enemies in the Dulaym were reconciled, land communications to Syria by Dayr al-Zur precariously reopened, and a major settlement on the reopened Saqlawiya Canal was carried out. Pro-Turkish Shammar elements recrossed into 'Iraq. The inlying Kurds made no history. The Diyalā tribes consented to the pacification of many of their long-standing feuds, and vigorous police action had good effect against obduracy. The settlement of Baghdad tribal sections on the redesigned Yusifiya Canal showed a new and hopeful pattern of regulated land-allotment. The middle-Tigris tribes were untroubled, surviving in peace the redistribution of 'Amara *muqaṭa'as* and the nagging claims of the Wali of Pusht-i-Kuh. In the Muntafiq alone the record was one of crime and restlessness, with violent reprisals and unpaid revenue. The situation, worsened by the wide possession of uncollected fire-arms, was due essentially to the persistent agrarian evils of the province, and could be but partially corrected by Police or Air Force action. The half-independent Shaykh of Zubayr provoked, at last, his own supersession by a normal Mudir. On the frontier of the Sultan of Najd—the title taken by ibn Sa'ud in 1920—the relations of the 'Iraqi Dhafir, 'Amarat, and outlying Muntafiq with the Ikhwan tribes were precarious since the influx in 1921 of fugitive Shammar elements into 'Iraq from the Sa'udi State. Minor raids were exchanged, neither Government being well able to control its border subjects; indeed, it was even whispered that the 'Iraqi monarch, in his private or dynastic capacity, was not unwilling that the anti-Hashimite Najdi prince should be thus harassed. The capture of Ha'il and extinction of the Rashidi State by ibn Sa'ud in November 1921 increased his prestige and pretensions. The appointment of a Sa'dun to command the 'Iraqi desert Camel Corps on the Najd frontier brought a further provocation to the irritated jealousies of both sides, that of personal enmity towards the Dhafir shaykh. The late winter of 1921–2 passed in daily expectation of larger-scale troubles, with the Ikhwan leader, Fayṣal al-Dawish, Shaykh of the Muṭayr, in aggressive mood.

Far more serious to the main fabric of 'Iraq were the conditions in these same months on its Turkish frontier and in 'Iraqi Kurdistan. The Turks, despite their total defeat in 1918, the abortive Treaty of Sèvres, and their own struggles for existence in Asia Minor, never ceased from offensive action on and across the Mosul border. They claimed the Mosul wilaya. Their National Pact of

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

172 founded in a single room in 1924, was more spaciously housed two years later. A suitable Antiquities Law was passed. This, and all Antiquities affairs, were handled at the King's request by Miss Bell as Honorary Director until her death, when she was succeeded in that capacity by Cooke of the Awqaf.

744 The Health service, under an 'Iraqi Director-General since 1922 with Dr. T. J. Hallinan as Inspector-General, developed slowly but soundly. It maintained its hospitals in main centres, its town dispensaries, its quarantine and pilgrim services, its specialist institutes for opthalmic, X-ray, pathological, chemical, and anti-rabies work, and its training courses in pharmacy and nursing. The twenty-five 'Iraqi and Lebanese doctors employed in 1921 increased to over eighty within ten years; British doctors in the same decade fell from forty to twenty, British nurses from twenty-four to eleven, and Indian (subordinate) staff from over two hundred to four. Out-patient attendances rose from 715,000 in 1921 to 1,600,000 in 1926, and were to be double that figure in 1930. The 'Iraq Railways had their separate medical service. The Jewish hospital of Mir Elias in Baghdad continued independent. A severe cholera epidemic was well handled in 1923.

619 721 166 622 In the tribal world something of a new spirit now manifest could well raise hopes for a future of peace and settlement. Although the economic background of tribal unrest—uncertainty of land rights, the claims of absentee title-holders, uncontrolled irrigation, insecurity, and unjustly small crop-shares—was all unchanged, and although to many a shaykh local autarky or anarchy was still the ideal, yet there were forces also on the side of order and progress. Such police or punitive action as Government was forced to take in the period 1922 to 1926 was invariably effective. Age-long feuds, such as that of the 'Ana and Rawa folk, were composed; the toll-taking and raiding of the Shammar diminished. The marsh area of Chuba'ish was happily transformed by the removal of its potentate, Salim al-Khayyun: disobedience was chastised in 'Afak and Samawa areas, and elsewhere a score of tribal offences were punished. The opening of roads in the mid-Euphrates marsh-intersected districts, with new police posts soundly constructed and regular patrols of mounted or motorized police, had good effect. And Government tribal policy had itself been modified. An element in the 1920 insurrection was held to be the grant, under British policy, of excessive authority to the shaykhs; an 'Iraqi governing class substantially urban and anti-tribal was unlikely to persist in this attitude. To penetrate, break up, weaken, and thus 'civilize' the tribe became and remained the policy of the 'Iraq Government, as it had been of the Ottoman. Even the tribal leaders who sat in Parliament or joined in party

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

movements and haunted ministerial ante-rooms now thought of seeking their advantage by Government action rather than by tribal disobedience. Reports made in 1926 show satisfaction at the decrease of raiding, the willing recourse of tribesmen to the Sarays, better Government control, and fruitful use made of the Tribal Disputes Regulations—one of the most valuable legacies of the British régime.

8. DEVELOPMENT

If major irrigation works were precluded in this period by the poverty of the State, it was no less valuable that a permanent irrigation service, staffed by specialists and relying on ever-widening surveys, was watching conditions, accumulating data, constructing small works of immediate value—canal-heads, regulators, realignments—redesigning vital flood-banks, and planning the future. Without it, the stagnation and deterioration of the Turkish era must have continued, and the serious floods of 1923 and 1926, which with disastrous damage inundated outlying quarters of Baghdad itself, including a railway station and Customs warehouse, must have been yet more ruinous. Considerable canals from the mid-Euphrates left-bank above the Barrage—the Ṣaqlawiya and Yusifiya—were re-created and their lands carefully allotted. The Hindiya Barrage itself was extensively repaired and improved. The Department of Irrigation was administered by A. B. Aitken until 1921, by P. J. Sellier until 1925, and J. M. Wilson during that year, and by L. E. Bury from the Sudan from 1925–8.

In the field of agriculture, a department under an 'Iraqi director-general since 1924, J. F. Webster was Inspector-General in succession to the pioneer of Iraq cotton-growing, Roger Thomas; but here, too, far less could be attempted than the needs of the territory demanded. Land settlement could not yet be other than local, ill based, and occasional; the disastrous agrarian background was unchanged; and experiments in new crops, silk-growing, and seed varieties made at the Agricultural Institute must remain at present without effect on the prevailing practices of an agriculturally primeval peasantry. Nevertheless, a beginning was made with scientific cotton cultivation, for which high hopes were formed; the British Cotton Growing Association opened an agency and erected a modern ginnery. A large-scale general farm on mechanized lines was started by an Englishman near Mosul, but did not long survive. The Wolfra Syndicate, which hired land on the Diyalā and attempted modern farming methods, similarly could not overcome native conservatism and renounced its enterprise. The King himself owned an important estate near Khaniqin, and

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

VI

TO INDEPENDENCE

I. TREATY DEADLOCK

THE six years which followed the beginning of parliamentary Government in 'Iraq and the Mosul settlement appeared to observers largely to fulfil the hopes which the record of the years 1921 to 1926 had allowed them to form, and to justify optimism for the future. Efforts, successful in 1932, were made to complete the emancipation of the Kingdom from mandatory bonds; it became a free and equal member of the League of Nations. Foreign control was progressively reduced, then formally extinguished. Non-'Iraqi staffs diminished in numbers and function, and the 'peculiar situation' of diarchic rule, as it was accused of being, came to an end. Judicial privileges for foreigners ceased, with Courts and procedures equal for all. 'Iraq's international repute, already raised by the publicity given to, and the outcome of, the Mosul controversy, was enhanced by the debates at Geneva which concerned the country, and by its admission to the League. With its important neighbours, Turkey and Persia, it achieved normal relations: with the Arab world it greatly increased its contacts. Its communications by land and air to foreign lands developed beyond all precedent. The problems presented by the minority communities within 'Iraq remained, it was true, essentially unsolved; but they changed in character and could offer, to an optimism which the future did not justify, grounds for the hope of peaceful solution. The same is true of the powerful Shi'i block of Euphrates tribesmen. It was clear during these years that tribal resentment at the obligations of orderly Government was not extinct, and that instigation to tribal insurgence—most dangerous of weapons—could become a political manœuvre; but these were less features of this period than of the succeeding years. Meanwhile, the means of dealing with tribal unrest were further developed in the form of roads, bridges, organized forces, and a closer administrative network. The Army grew and improved, though the puzzling question of compulsory service in it was unsolved. Serious attempts were made to deal with taxation questions, a national currency was planned, the Public Debt substantially liquidated. Land Settlement procedures on modern lines were by 1932 on the point of establishment, while a great expansion of pump irrigation transformed the riverain countryside. These progressive features did not prevent the heavy affliction of 'Iraqi

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

the terrain least familiar to 'Iraqi troops and most favourable to their mountain-born enemy.

The Police, with an all-'Iraqi executive element and a British inspectorate, was for long the most praised of 'Iraqi services. Developing special forces for particular areas and needs—the Southern Desert, the Railways, frontiers, and the Port—the force, some 8,000 strong in all by 1932, improved also its specialist branches and preserved a fair though not infallible level of security. In 1921 British officers, British sergeants, 'Iraqi officers and 'Iraqi inspectors had numbered respectively 22, 71, 2, and 92; ten years later the figures were 12, 5, 59, and 299. Many notorious wrong-doers—a town gang at Karbalā, Kurdish outlaws of Chamchamal—were traced and tackled, co-operation was offered with the trans-frontier Turks, increased mileages of motor roads were safely policed, and urban traffic ably handled. Prisons were by 1930 well conducted on modern lines under all-'Iraqi executive control, with flourishing prison industries and a boys' reformatory.

Another element contributory to the comparative tribal quietude of these years was the advance in road-making in hitherto inaccessible areas of marsh and mountain, and the increasing mechanization of Government forces. Yet another was the progress made towards direct Government administration, with decreased reliance on the tribal shaykhs; a significant change of policy since Occupation days. The Arms Regulations, imperfectly applied, did little to prevent the carrying of firearms, but the application of the Tribal Disputes Regulations at least helped to settle intelligently, though they could not prevent, inter-tribal quarrels. The prospect of conscription alarmed such tribesmen as were aware of it, and the Census Department, a necessary preliminary to it, did not venture to push its early operations into tribal territory. The intrigues of Baghdad statesmen with tribal leaders, to embarrass their rivals' Ministries, belong rather to the period following 1932; but the policy of the Ikhā had, even before Independence, already tended in that fatal direction. The quarrels of tribal tenants and their landlords on the Gharraf in 1928 need no such explanation, nor the lawlessness of a Ḥammar marsh-shaykh in the same year which led to his punishment and flight. Tribal raiding across the Turkish frontier was inevitable, but could be localized. The Kurdish tribes and Christian villagers immigrant from Turkey in 1926 were settled in 'Iraq without mishap, and a migration without precedent by the Kifri and Ḥawija tribes in 1928 to the Persian frontier around Mandali, seeking pasture, was quiet and bloodless. Three years later the dangerous bazaar strike—encouraged, it was said, by the Ikhā—would if successful have opened the Euphrates townships to tribal raiding; and many shaykhs felt or hoped that

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

the passing of British influence would lead back to the greater freedom of Turkish times.

It was by grace of the relative security of the countryside that archaeological fieldwork could proceed as it did in many tribal areas. The Department of Antiquities, with its improved Museum, was able to form a collection of recovered treasures from 'Iraqi soil which was soon to be among the finest in the world for Sumerian, Babylonian, and Assyrian history. It was increased by the devoted labour, pursued in safety though amid total popular incomprehension, of learned expeditions at Ur, near Naṣiriya: at Kish, near Ḥilla: at Khorsabad, Koyunjik, and Nineveh near Mosul: at Tirkalan by Kirkuk: at Ctesiphon, south of Baghdad: at Warqa, Lagash, Tall Lu', and Tall Billi in central 'Iraq: at Samarrā, and on the lower Diyalā. These many excavations were the work of British, American, German, and French universities and learned bodies, represented locally by scholars of high repute, and co-ordinated by the Department of Antiquities. Apart from their value to the cause of scholarship and their enrichment of 'Iraq's visible assets, the expeditions enhanced the country's prestige, with an immediate harvest of goodwill and tourist traffic. Efforts were made to interest Government in stopping illicit traffic in stolen antiquities: a task not aided by patriot press denunciations of the 'exploitation' of 'Iraq's ancient sites by 'foreign companies'. A British School of Archaeology in 'Iraq was founded in 1929 as a memorial to Miss Gertrude Bell.

6. COMMUNICATIONS AND DEVELOPMENT

The Baghdad–Damascus desert motor route was steadily developed during the later nineteen-twenties. The Nairn–Eastern Company, amalgamated thus in 1925, survived the appearance and early failure of local rivals, improved its services, and evolved specially designed vehicles: King Faysal himself christened their giant 'six-wheelers' in 1927. A mid-desert fort and rest-house at Ruṭba, with its police post and wireless station, was constructed in the same year. On no more than one or two occasions, though notably in 1928, were desert convoys interrupted by bedouin raiders.

Other highway developments of the period were considerable, as the increasing volume of wheeled road traffic demanded; motor vehicles had increased from a few dozen in 1920 to 3,500 private cars and 1,000 lorries in 1930. But the quality of roads did not improve as did their mileage, in spite of increased use of road-making machinery, and only short sections were, for the first time, metalled and bitumen-surfaced. By 1930 not more than 170 miles, of a total of 4,500, had been thus improved. Certain railway bridges

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

It was succeeded immediately by a diluted Ikhā Ministry under Yasin Pasha, summoned to power this time, on 17 March 1935, without conditions. Destined to rule 'Iraq for twenty months, it included Rashid 'Ali Gaylani at Interior, Ja'far Pasha at Defence, Nuri at Foreign Affairs, two Shi'is—Ra'uf Bahrani, a former Finance Inspector, at Finance, and Muhammad Ridhā al-Shabibi, a figure in the learned and literary world, at Education—and Amin Zaki at Works. There was no representative of the left-wing group (that of the *Ahali* newspaper) under Abu al-Timman; and the omission of Hikmat Sulayman, to his keen resentment, was to lead later to serious results.

The tribal situation to which, from Hilla to Nasiriya, the new Ministry had forthwith to address itself, was in large measure significant of the mere anti-Government lawlessness of tribes and of the patriarchal feudalism always preferred by the Shi'i leadership. As such it was a familiar 'Iraqi phenomenon from Ottoman times. But in so far as it had been produced by intrigue from Baghdad and from Najf in support of the 'political' aims of statesmen—themselves but little concerned with tribal or Shi'i advantage—it recalled the similarly evoked anti-British *Thawra* of 1920. Indeed, the history of the Euphrates in 1935 and 1936 reproduces faithfully the episodes of 1920 on a smaller but important scale. It shows again the ease with which the shaykhs were willing to follow, as they followed in 1920, any movement which seemed to offer them personal or tribal advantage—Government-appointed paramountcy in the tribe, a seat in the Chamber, a reopened land dispute, or a grant of rice-lands—with motives of no wider a patriotism than those similarly exploited by the Baghdadis fifteen years earlier.

Yasin Pasha achieved, by an air-dropped Proclamation to the tribes, a substantial immediate pacification. It was followed by visits to Baghdad by the Ikhā-favoured shaykhs. Their car-loads of festive armed followers filled the capital, with the complacent permission of the Minister of the Interior but to the alarm of onlookers. Eager for some immediate gain from their recent 'patriotic' uprisings, they mingled in street and ante-room with the Kurdish deputations from the northern liwās which, organized by the Ikhā to protest against the misdeeds of the Ayubi and Madfa'i Ministries, arrived in time to congratulate their successors. A serious episode at Kadhimiya, in which bloodshed resulted from a clash between police and a crowd demonstrating against the desecration of a graveyard, was without political meaning and could be composed without wider repercussions. The King, whose mother died in March, was acclaimed as father of a son and heir apparent—the later Faysal II—on 2 May. Parliament adjourned early in April and general elections were ordered in May.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

But the Euphrates ferment could not be so easily cooled. If one major faction was satisfied by the advent to power of the Ikhā, its rivals were with reason suspicious of a Ministry whose opponents they had recently supported. Yasin Pasha's repudiation of all party preferences, his promise of Deputies' seats to ex-opponents and his dissolution of the Ikhā Party itself were unconvincing. The attempted use of Kashif al-Ghaṭā as pacifier was not successful. The 'Alim was simultaneously approached by the group hostile to 'Abd al-Waḥid, but was unwilling to offend his former friends and temporized. But his completed list of Shi'i demands, not in itself immoderate, created indignation in Sunni circles of Baghdad; and other Shi'i spiritual influence, added to the movements of anti-Ikhā politicians in Baghdad, was not absent from the incitements to further tribal trouble-making which were visible as early as April, and bore fruit in the later spring and summer of 1935.

The first outbreak came in May from the Bani Zurayj near Rumaytha, a traditional storm-centre. Here, with a background of vengeful land disputes and the encouragements of absentee politicians, the arrest of a minor 'Alim led to a rising. The railway line was cut, a Government office seized, appeals for help broadcast. But the Government this time acted quickly. Forces under General Bakr Ṣidqi bombed and dispersed the rebels, captured Shaykh Khawwam al-Ḥajj 'Abbas their leader, and entered Rumaytha. The expected allies from lower Euphrates tribes failed to rally to the rebels' support. But the movement had spread southwards, tribesmen in the Suq al-Shuyukh area were 'out', had cut the line at Tall al-Laḥm and Ur, burnt Government records at 'Ukayka, and fought successfully with the police. The history of the Bani Zurayj and Rumaytha was repeated. Bakr Ṣidqi's troops and aircraft, moving with ruthless speed and spirit, by-passed broken communications (which the frightened tribesmen hastened to repair) and entered Samawa and then Suq. Scores of arrests were made. Nine death sentences and some dozens of imprisonments were pronounced by courts martial[1]—with little discrimination, it was said, between innocent and guilty. The success of the campaign did much, but not enough and not permanently, to correct the subversive and centrifugal tribal spirit which, with sad unwisdom, the politicians of Baghdad had themselves encouraged.

In other tribal unrest of 1935 and 1936 fear of the application of conscription was a major element. Among the Yazidis, who had passed three quieter years, Government saw fit to make no con-

[1] Recourse to martial law, legalized by Ordinance in 1935, was frequent in the period now opening and led to scores or hundreds of rough-and-ready trials by courts martial.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

cessions to their peculiar beliefs and customs, and met their active and passive resistance by sending a brigade of troops in September 1935. This bloodless operation was followed by the institution of courts martial which, with savage severity and no adequate trials, hanged nine of their leaders, including two Christians, and imprisoned 350 alleged resisters. These were later progressively released: but Da'ud al-Da'ud remained a fugitive in Syria, where numbers of his followers tried persistently to join him. The Barzani Kurds, subdued by joint 'Iraqi-Turkish operations in 1933 which captured Shaykh Aḥmad, gave further trouble in 1934 and 1935 under the truculent leader of a considerable force, Khalil Khushawi. This bandit, who for long defied the combined operations of 'Iraqis and Turks, dodged across frontiers from valley to valley and destroyed the villages of all who denounced him. Later in 1935 most of his followers were rounded up, and a dozen hanged; he himself vanished, to reappear in mid-winter and to be caught and shot in March 1936. In Sulaymaniya liwā a similar character, Sayid Muḥammad Pichkola, led looting parties in 'Iraq from a base in Persia. After long-drawn police operations he surrendered in August 1935, and was pardoned. In the same weeks, deep in southern 'Iraq, resistance to conscription was leading the Mudayna village of Qurna to armed protest which called for military suppression.

The year 1936 brought no peace to rural 'Iraq. The incitements to lawlessness first set afoot in 1934, the rancour of never-settled land disputes, the fear and hatred of conscription, and maladroit or corrupt local administration were added to the endemic causes of tribal restlessness. In February insurgence among the Shaṭra tribes brought troops to the Gharraf, and the usual measures quelled the rising in a few weeks. In the Muntafiq an assault on a police post in the Suq area was punished by fines and prison-sentences. In April a section of the Bani Ḥuchaym in Rumaytha district cut the railway, rallied a force of 1,200 armed tribesmen, and heavily engaged troops sent to suppress them. Casualties were heavy, the Army lost ninety men and two aircraft. Reprisals of corresponding severity, with the hanging of rebel leaders after little or no trial and the burning of villages, were reported in Baghdad, there to distress the squeamish and help the Opposition. The 'Akra district of Diwaniya witnessed a rising of the notorious Sha'lan al-'Aṭiya, unsatisfied by his rewards for opposing the Ministry of 'Ali Jawdat. It was not less brutally suppressed by Bakr Ṣidqi in June 1936; and in August a force of the Ṣafwan tribe, near Khidhr in Samawa qadhā, attacked the Government office and, though dispersed, were still unsubdued in the autumn of the year.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

*645 imprisonment for 'exciting hatred against the Government'; all the other accused were acquitted for lack of evidence.

Ṣaliḥ Jabr, dissatisfied, resigned from the Cabinet; nor was this the only evidence of Cabinet disunion. Tired and ill at ease, and likely to be pressed by public opinion and the Army clique further from his policy acclaimed as 'pro-British', Nuri was more than willing to relinquish the premiership, and on 17 March again resigned office.

619 These vicissitudes of Baghdad politics had, as usual, no great effect on events outside the council chambers. Tribal life was scarcely conscious of the current crises—or, indeed, of the World War itself. A violent tribal battle between two sections of the 'Aniza cost, it was said, 200 lives. Hostilities between the 'Ubayd and Shammar, which flared up late in 1939, were not prolonged. 'Ajil al-Yawir, Paramount Chief of the Shammar, great in stature and shaykhly qualities, died late in 1940 and was succeeded by his son, Sufuk. Northern 'Iraq watched with head-shakings a scandal among the Yazidis, where the child-wife of Sa'id Bey, their Mir, fled in dudgeon to Syria. A military mission of 'Iraqi officers left Baghdad for the Yaman, at the Imam's request. The second of the 499 Baghdad steel bridges built by Holloways, 900 feet in length and named after King Fayṣal, was completed.

4. GAYLANI AND HASHIMI

*645 The advice of Rashid 'Ālī, as head of the Royal Diwan, to the Regent was to install, if he could, an all-party Ministry capable of uniting loyalties and avoiding the pressures of the Army. A meeting at the palace was attended by all ex-Prime Ministers—Nuri Sa'id, both the Suwaydis, Madfa'i, Naji Shawkat, 'Ali Jawdat. These offered the Regent their promise to support whatever constitutional Government should be appointed. Nuri himself proposed the appointment of Rashid 'Ālī, to which the Regent agreed; and thus was formed the first Ministry for four years to assume office in 'Iraq without military pressure. It carried high hopes of stability. The Cabinet announced by the new Prime Minister on 31 March contained Naji Shawkat at the Ministry of Justice, Naji al-Suwaydi at Finance, Nuri Sa'id at Foreign Affairs, Ṭaha al-Hashimi at Defence, 'Umr Nadhmi at Works, Muḥammad Amin Zaki at Economics, and the two Shi'is, Ṣādiq Baṣṣam and Ra'uf Baḥrani, at Social Affairs and Education. Rashid 'Ālī retained the portfolio of Interior in his own hands. The reappointment of Nuri and Ṭaha seemed to stand for continuity, and suggested the united front of a 'National Coalition Government' which it claimed to be. The ministerial programme declared an attitude of perfect correctness towards the British alliance.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

'Iraqi-Turkish bloc would be—worst of all crimes—acceptable to Great Britain. Nevertheless it was ratified, and a State visit by the Turkish President was anticipated. Some urged revival of the Sa'dabad Pact, others disliked it as un-Arab. The Treaty of Brotherhood with the Jordan Kingdom was duly approved, amid the black looks and street demonstrations of the anti-Hashimite factions.

The early fall of the Suwaydi Ministry, due to opposition in the Chamber and Senate and lack of Palace support, occurred on 3 May. In spite of popular hopes for a neutral or all-party Government, perhaps under the Amir Zayd, to hold elections and consolidate the structure of Government, it was followed on 1 June by a Ministry of indifferent quality led by the forceful authoritarian Arshad al-'Umari. He was to remain in office for six months, with a marked personal domination of his colleagues and of all departments, and to deal characteristically with the political freedoms permitted by his predecessor. He named 'Abdullah al-Qaṣṣab to Interior, Yusif Ghanima to Finance and Supply, Muḥammad Ḥasan Kubba to Justice. The other ministers were all newcomers to Cabinet position: the Shi'i 'Abd al-Hadi al-Chalabi (son of old 'Abd al-Ḥusayn) at Works, Babā 'Ali, the modernized and Americanized son of Shaykh Maḥmud Barzinji, at Economics, Sa'id Ḥaqqi, another Kurd, at Defence, Fadhil Jamali at Foreign Affairs, Dr. 'Abd al-Hadi al-Pachachi—cousin of Ḥamdi and Muzaḥim—at Social Affairs, and Nuri al-Qadhi, a lawyer and judge of the old school, at Education. In August Qaṣṣab resigned his portfolio, which the Prime Minister assumed, and 'Abd al-Ilah Ḥafidh took that of Supplies.

In spite of Arshad's will to impose discipline and peace, his period of office was troubled. In the tribes an unusually bloody clash occurred in August between the Shammar and the Albu Muṭaywit, with the loss of 200 lives. Danger in Kurdistan seemed to diminish as the Russian attempt to consolidate its puppet Republics across the frontier failed, and disillusioned and starving Barzani families trickled homewards to be disarmed. Many of the rebels in Persian Kurdistan, including Qadhi Muḥammad, were hanged by their Government on re-entry; but Mullā Muṣṭafā refused all terms, escaped capture, and after failing to re-enter 'Iraq reached Soviet territory. The Government accepted the unconditional surrender of his brother Shaykh Aḥmad and of his son Shaykh 'Ubaydullah. Four Kurdish officers who had fought for the Mullā and a few other ex-ringleaders were sentenced to death, and the need to deal with the armed insurgence of Muḥammad Khalid, the son of Shaykh Aḥmad, forced Government to keep troops in the neighbourhood. In Sulaymaniya liwā hostilities

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

were threatened early in 1947 between the younger generation of the Barzani Sayids and the Jaf, and in Arbil the peace was barely kept between the Pishdar and Piran. An earthquake occurred in Panjwin in October, with loss of life. The situation in Khuzistan, where the Communist Tudeh Party in mid-summer 1946 was able to produce conditions of disorder at the Abadan refinery, called for the dispatch of British troops from India to Shu'ayba as a precaution, to which the Baghdad Government was criticized by the Opposition for consenting. A serious strike was organized by politicians of Communist sympathy in July among the Iraq Petroleum Company's labour at Kirkuk, although pay and conditions of service there were well above current 'Iraqi levels. It was settled through Government arbitration, but not before the interruption of an illegal meeting in Kirkuk town by the police had led to bloodshed, a tragic episode for which publicists hastened to blame the Company itself.

In the field of politics the Prime Minister felt himself forced by the extravagancies of the press and party-leaders to adopt a policy of suppression. Two newspapers were prohibited and arrests made after a clash between demonstrators and police in June, when some 3,000 students and workers demanded immediate British withdrawal from 'Iraq and a favourable settlement of the Palestine Question. In August and September more papers were suppressed for inflammatory writing, whereon a strike of newspaper employees was declared. Members of the Communist 'Anti-Zionist League' were sentenced for the issue of subversive leaflets, and the *Daily Worker* was banned throughout the country. The effect of these steps, which as ever the politicians seemed first by their actions wantonly to invite, then by outcry to execrate, was to widen the gap between the responsible Government and the irresponsible aspirants to power, and, somehow, to confirm the latter in their identification of the British with the governing class. The 'Umari Ministry, approved by conservative elements for its firmness, gained little favour from its implacable critics by its announced ten-year plan (at an ill-chosen moment of looming financial crisis) or by such gestures as the end-of-Ramadhan donation to officials, the abolition of secondary school fees, and the opening of a relief fund for the Panjwin earthquake victims.

In the foreign field of inter-Arab united effort, Arshad's policy was correct and acceptable. 'Iraq had welcomed the new status which 'Transjordan (hereafter the Hashimite Kingdom of the Jordan) had gained by its treaty with Great Britain early in 1946, and was represented by the Regent and Prime Minister at a conference at Shuna which sealed 'Iraq–Jordan 'identity of views'; and, concurrently with general Arab League moves and meetings

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

and mountain units, seemed to be well suited to its probable internal duties; for service abroad, other than token or ceremonial, it was not at present adapted. Whether the leading spirits of the Army would in future resist the temptation to assert themselves not as servants but as masters of the State remained to be seen. There had been, in the ten years since the adventure of the Golden Square, no sign of repeating the coups of 1935 to 1941, or of imitating the Syrian Dictator-Colonels of the day. But the danger was real; the Army leaders lacked a sincere sense of service and subordination to the State, felt little respect for its civil institutions or solidarity with the public, and could not but be aware that there was no power anywhere to withstand them.

We turn now to the various elements of which 'Iraqi society was composed. Among the true bedouin, still leading their hard, hungry and unenvied lives, the visitor to their tents would find every scene and circumstance seemingly unchanged for the last five or fifty decades. The 'Aniza, the remoter Shammar, the Dhafir had little of novelty to show. Their extreme poverty forbade them any less primitive material equipment, and their social organization and isolation precluded almost every means of cultural progress. It was true that some greater bedouin shaykhs now owned motor-cars, carried wireless sets, and frequented towns, while their sons on occasion adopted an expatriate life of Western ways. It was clear also that the mechanized forces of Government now could penetrate the farthest areas of the *badiya*, that the ease of contact with Government had, since Turkish times, been helped by the use, in the Administration, of the language of the country instead of a foreign tongue known to no tribesman: that the tendency to settle family by family on the desert fringes of cultivation was not less, perhaps was greater, than it had ever been, and that Kurdish mountain nomadism was now restricted partly by the seductions of a sedentary life, partly by more sophisticated and less feebly enforced frontier restrictions. All these elements were operative, and had much diminished the nomad chieftains' power to defy Government or harass neighbours; but they had changed neither the manner and fashion of their existence nor its social or economic bases. Among the true nomads the tribal organization provided still the essential rallying unit, and the shaykhs or aghās would still be followed.

In the countryside of sedentary tribesmen, the continuity of outward appearance—scene, dress, dwelling, dialect, and food—half concealed the changes which fifty years had wrought. If the area occupied by tribal life had been locally reduced by the weakening of tribalism in the inlying villages, yet for the rest a first glance reveals a world seemingly unaltered from that of fifty years earlier:

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

619 511 unaltered in the influence still wielded by many shaykhs in their tribes, the continued possibility of 'tribal outbreaks', the persisting backwardness of the ignorant and credulous tribal mind, and the sadly low living standards of the apathetic poor with their malnutrition, disease, and brevity of life. Yet, and not least in the twenty 619 years since Independence, there had been change in directions 178 which may, to summarize them, be treated as fourfold. The first 511 was economic; thanks to better irrigation control, more State and private assistance in agriculture, and better communications, there had been progress, however humble and precarious, towards [177] security of livelihood. The second change was psychological; it was shown by the partial expansion of the tribal mind to include some part of the interests of an outside world now brought within reach by easier travel, livelier commerce, the spread of Government's social services, wireless receiving-sets, and the increased use of Western fabrics and utensils: every new survey, census, police inquiry, telegraph line, or canal alignment was a step away from the old tribal seclusion. The third element of change lay in the penetration of the countryside by State forces now, as never before, mobile, well equipped, and ubiquitous; using communications inconceivable before, they could in a day anticipate and disperse the disobedient in the remotest areas. The tribes were in fact now, for the first time and for ever, militarily helpless. Finally, detribalization itself had made further steps in that inevitable progress which, in 'Iraq as in Scotland, must no doubt end by reducing the tribes or clans as such to mere picturesque survivals evocative of nostalgic pride. By 1950 greater approximation to the non-tribal public had offered interests and loyalties which could compete with those of the old tribal nucleus: stability of residence, safety from raids, and Government ubiquity gave less and less place for leadership on the old lines, and the new economics of agriculture had in many cases substituted a contrary grouping and new allegiances. The shaykhs, no longer appointed or recognized by the State, were often themselves deputies or haunters of Ministries, lived largely in Baghdad or their local liwā headquarters, and had departed far from tribal austerity in their addiction to city pleasures, while their sons could go, and went, to higher studies and Western sophistication at Beirut, Cambridge, or Columbia. The picture of the 'Iraqi tribal world in 1950 is, indeed, that of an early but not the earliest stage of an uneasy, perhaps unhappy, transition from an archaic, remote, and static condition towards the civilization—itself transitional and unformed—of the country at large and of its cities. The coalescence of tribal and tribeless folk had well begun; and, whatever were its continued backwardnesses, 'Iraq in 1950 could for the first time expect from its tribal groups not, as of

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

old, mere trouble and recalcitrance, but a contribution both economically and politically valuable to a modern State.

In the towns, an observer of conditions in 1950 was faced with the same dilemma as in the tribes: how extensive was the change, if any, which fifty years had brought about? Outwardly at least, it was considerable. If some parts of the towns were as narrow, airless, and planless as of old—if the same donkeys carried the same goods for sale amid the flies and jostling of the same bazaars—yet in the main traffic streets and the new quarters all was changed and unrecognizable; and modernized surroundings, with the public State services now maintained, could not but contribute to the sum of urban well-being. All the larger towns had improved approaches, modern suburbs ranging from a few villas to whole areas of planned streets, planted boulevards, public gardens, and modern public buildings[1] immensely superior to those of Ottoman Turkey, few and cheaply constructed as these buildings had been forced to be.[2] Street-cleaning services were—save perhaps in the labyrinth of an 'old quarter'—not inadequate; streets were well maintained, increasingly paved, and widened where possible. Town planning schemes were under execution with the inclusion, or the hope, of house-building developments for the working poor and for Government officials; and private enterprise in building was encouraged by the improved security, the well-kept title-registers, the development of town amenities, and the need for outlets for safe investment. In the capital a modern omnibus service—the autonomous Baghdad Passenger Transport Board—supplied all needs and would naturally be, as in Baṣra it had been, imitated in the provincial towns. Taxicabs were everywhere abundant and in Baghdad had nearly, but not quite, driven the ancient *'arabana* from the streets. Traffic control was excellent. Steel or masonry bridges had in many places besides Baghdad and Mosul replaced the primitive pontoon river crossings. Modern shops had come year by year into existence, and could provide buyers of all classes with all but exceptional needs. Hotels offered a near approach to normal European service. The cinema was well established; American, European, and Egyptian films were shown in some sixty picture-theatres throughout 'Iraq. Efficient fire services existed in the principal towns, and had well justified themselves. Systems of piped water and electrical installations for power and lighting had been constructed in all larger towns; the

[1] The mausoleum of King Faysal I, built in 1934–6, is usually accounted the finest modern building in 'Iraq.

[2] Large sums were however allotted by the Development Board to building projects for the period 1951–6: for hospitals and health institutions, ID 5,400,000: for schools, 5,400,000: for other public buildings, 5,250,000: and for housing (officials and the poor), 1,650,000.

647 records of miri land, such management and control as is possible of these
423 heterogeneous and extensive territories must be carried out primarily in the district by persons in direct touch with the people and the parcels affected. Many questions are no doubt settled by the customary social leaders as elsewhere (e.g. tribal sheikhs) and never reach the administration. Those that do may in some cases be dealt with by one of the few local officers of the State Domains or even by another Department (e.g. on the Yuseflya by the Irrigation). But ordinarily the effective agents of Government in the control of miri lands are the officers of the provincial administration on the spot, who must act for the most part according to their individual judgment or on the instructions of their provincial superiors in each case. This local control is naturally subject to the direction, and occasionally to the intervention, of the State Domains service or the Ministry to which it is responsible. It is also necessarily subject to intervention by the Ministry of the Interior or of any other Ministry, whose public responsibilities may be affected by some action taken. It is further subject to intervention by any Deputy or influential private person who may be concerned or interested.

423 In a limited number of cases, disputes affecting the holding of miri
692 land are decided under the Tribal Civil and Criminal Disputes Regulations, because of their reaction on tribal peace and public security. But since such disputes in theory merely concern the domestic management by Government of its own estates, they do not as a rule fall within the jurisdiction of any regular Court of Justice. Reference has already been made to the general failure to introduce the Land Code and more particularly tapu tenure effectively. Consequently by the side of a truncated and semi-atrophied Statute Law there have survived throughout the greater majority of the land, methods of acquiring and holding land which have never been regulated by law at all.

423 2. An attempt has already been made to illustrate in broad outline
427 the conditions under which land has been for the most part occupied and cultivated in the rainfall zone. There are commonly two classes of people concerned. Firstly (*a*) the larger man, who may be the local Agha or a small capitalist who has helped to develop the land by providing funds, seed, etc. Secondly (*b*) the actual cultivator who, in the mountainous districts, has tamed the wilderness by building terraces, constructing water channels, clearing the ground, etc., and who, in the plains, has similarly, if less laboriously, reclaimed the land by regular tillage and fallow. It is evident that in actual fact a partnership commonly existed or exists between these two classes.

Now it is generally accepted that the intention of the Ottoman legislator, when promulgating the Land Code, was to establish the actual cultivator on the land; and when that cultivator has remained on the same land and effected improvements of a capital nature by his labour, his claim is clear. But the claim of the larger man instanced, who will almost invariably have co-operated in some indispensable way (e.g. by according protection, providing capital or essential assistance), who has very likely been acknowledged as landlord (mallak) and perhaps regularly received mallakiya, cannot be equitably or advisedly disregarded. Investigation on the spot would be needed to weigh the respective claims in each case; but it can be seen that, broadly speaking, local conditions have often produced an association in the development and cultivation of the land between local overlord and cultivating holder in these regions, in which both have rights that should be recognised in their mutual interest as well as that of the country at large.

423 In the Irrigation Zone and throughout the desert borders the Turks
619 found the land for the most part in the hands of tribal confederations.

The influence of these confederations waxed and waned with changing personalities and circumstances. The original tribes (ashaiyir) of el Iraq were, of course, pastoral nomads following the grass with their herds of camels, sheep and goats. As throughout history generally, when they found that cultivation was economically advantageous they began to settle. Without going into earlier happenings, it is evident that the Ottoman Government were never in a position to exercise any systematic control of the large areas of miri land throughout the country. Under the conditions that commonly prevailed the authority of the Government ran slowly outside the larger towns, while for the most part the effective local and social units were the tribal confederations or their component groups. These groups, larger or smaller according to circumstances, occupied and used such areas of land as they desired and were able to hold against rivals. The territorial hold of tribal groups naturally varied in stability. It varied with the varying power of rival or associated groups and their need for the land. And it was doubtless always amenable to special exertions of authority on the part of the Central Government. But subject to such vicissitudes, innumerable tribal groups exercised the effective control of miri land from day to day throughout the majority of the country.

When land was brought under cultivation a prescriptive right to such occupation was usually asserted. These claims were not limited to the parcels actually tilled, for cultivation shifted annually to offset the exhaustion of the soil and in response to other variables, while provision for prospective cultivation was also included. Such provision for the future was of particular importance in the rice areas, where the rice-growing fringes of the land encroach slowly year by year on the marshes. In these valuable tracts the rivalry between adjoining tribal groups is now intense and calls insistently for competent independent regulation in the general interests of rice cultivation and the orderly development of the steadily advancing waterways. Elsewhere, apart from favoured spots, where special facilities for irrigation or fruit-growing exist, there is still a dearth of the agricultural population needed for the development of the country.

Prescriptive claims to pasture wandering flocks and herds still remain more extensive than such claims to cultivation: and, although they preponderantly apply to the bordering desert and steppe, they also affect the regularly cultivated areas. Indeed the right to browse flocks on immature barley (ghasil) is still widely practised.

All these customary prescriptive claims to rights of cultivation or pasture, may be asserted long after the uses on which they are based have ceased. Thus I heard of numerous cases of tribal groups who had migrated from one district to another, possibly many years ago, and yet on due occasion advanced prescriptive claims to the area they had abandoned as stoutly as they maintained their right to the lands they had since occupied and used. These occasions were usually some favourable change in the conditions of the abandoned area, e.g. the provision of irrigation facilities previously lacking. It need hardly be suggested that deliberate voluntary abandonment of the use of an area for any purpose should extinguish any prescriptive claim to such use.

8. A great impulse has been given to the permanent settlement of the tribesmen during the last decade by the improvement—almost the creation—of communications, by the growth of law and order, by the installation of pumps throughout the riverain tracts, and by the taste for modern civilisation induced by such things as motor cars, gramophones, better dwellings, more frequent visits to towns. Throughout the countryside the camel hair tent of the Bedu' has been giving way to the

166 reed mat hut, and the mat hut to the mud, or even the burnt-brick 178 building. This movement has naturally been accompanied by a weakening of tribal cohesion and tribal authority, as the machinery of the provincial administration of Government has penetrated into the less accessible regions and as increasing numbers of the population have been brought individually in touch with local provincial officers over their daily affairs.

166 The development of direct dealings by the local provincial officer 423 (mudir) with small landholders and cultivators in his sub-district 651 (nahiya) over land and land revenue questions has naturally tended, wherever it has been in operation, to transfer the effective control of 619 miri land increasingly from tribal influence to such officers. In many liwas I was afforded evidence of the numbers of smaller men paying their land revenue directly to provincial officials and occupying the position of smallholders, either as heads (sirakil) of minor tribal or other farming groups, or even on a more individual footing. And everywhere I was advised tribal disintegration was accelerating, everywhere the tribesman was becoming an individualist and wanting his individual holding. The movement is not, of course, new. Under Turkish administration it no doubt proceeded wherever the authority of Government was effective; but its range was necessarily more circumscribed and the impelling forces much less. Nor can it be counted upon to continue. If the provincial administration deteriorated again some reversion to, and strengthening of, tribal influences would be natural.

423 4. In the numerous discussions that have taken place during recent 619 years regarding the legal recognition of customary prescriptive claims to miri land, more particularly in connection with the installations of pumps, the term *lazma* came to be generally applied to these claims. So far as I have been able to ascertain, the term lazma was applied in Turkish times, among other words, to the customary prescriptive claim of the tribe to land already mentioned. It was represented to me that this might be more correctly and explicitly defined as a right of occupation and cultivation (haq el sakna wa zira'). Within the area concerned the tribal or sub-tribal sheikh would allot the land to adult males of the tribe according to tribal custom, and to be held subject thereto. There was no personal lazma right. Allotments to individual tribesmen could be, and frequently were, resumed by the sheikh.

423 Since the war the conception of a tribal or sub-tribal lazma seems to have weakened and that of a corresponding prescriptive claim of an individual or smaller group to have been to some extent substituted. The appropriateness of the term in the latter sense is disputed; but regarded as a label for any prescriptive claim to occupy and hold miri land, it seems to have held the field and to have been commonly understood and accepted.

423 According to prevailing theory all holders of miri land are tenants 427 at will of the State. The land is supposed to be leased by an annual terminal agreement (shartnama). In practice, although such agreements may, and do, exist, they are far from being an indispensable, or even an ordinary feature of the occupation and use of miri land, even in districts most completely under central Government control. And it is not pretended that any annual review is made, with renewal or cancellation even of such agreements as do exist, still less that any systematic record and control of the innumerable theoretical leaseholders of miri land throughout the country is maintained. Indeed the mere administration of any such annual leasing of the numerous, enormous and widely distributed parcels of miri land is beyond the ability of any central

3: Clark S-5 (1950)1951 MH1 Iraq MH1

Some eight per cent of these tribal dwellers are still nomadic, and educational arrangements for them will obviously be most difficult to apply. People who are on the move, even if this be in regular seasonal cycles or over more or less fixed areas, are never susceptible to organized education. Even in countries where compulsory education laws have been in effect for several years and where school accommodation for the entire child population exists, it is not easy to make arrangements for the schooling of the children of mobile persons such as caravan and boat dwellers. Clearly, in a country like Iraq where the problem of mobility of population is of much greater magnitude, the conventional type of fixed village school is useless for these peoples. Some of them are not averse to education, and, especially in places where a sheikh is anxious that his own children shall be educated, there is an opportunity for providing educational facilities which would be shared by the other children of the tribal group. It is suggested, therefore, that the time is opportune for giving serious consideration to the training of peripatetic teachers of the kind recommended by the Monroe Commission in 1932.

The more urgent problem of tribal education relates to that majority of the tribal peoples who are in the stage of transition from nomadism to a more settled agricultural life. People who are passing through this transitional stage present great problems but also great opportunities to the educator. They are alleged to lose some of the simpler virtues of people who are forced to submit to the strict tribal laws and codes while they are still wandering in the desert. Be that as it may, they undoubtedly need practical education in the amenities of the more settled life, particularly in matters of health, child care under primitive housing conditions and agricultural practice. Their children also need schooling. These educational needs are becoming more acute because, as has been indicated in a previous chapter when discussing the problem of land tenure, the tribal peoples are losing their former wholesome relationship with the sheikh, who is becoming more of a landlord interested in the produce of his tenants and less of a leader with a responsibility for their welfare.

These needs of the tribal dwellers, therefore, and especially those who are in the semi-settled stage, present a formidable challenge to the Iraqi educator. What is probably needed to meet their peculiar requirements is a team of peripatetic teachers who could travel with the tribes while they are on the move, and who could establish simple schools-cum-community-centres in the places where the tribesmen and their families are gradually settling. So far as is known, devices of this kind are as yet untried; it would be well if a few young men and women of ingenuity and a practical

3: Clark S-5 (1950) 1951 MH1 Iraq MH1

876 turn of mind, and preferably from the tribal areas themselves,
166 could be specially trained as intensely practical teachers and then appointed to establish pilot projects of tribal education.

871 Some people with whom these possibilities have been discussed
619 are not optimistic about such attempts to meet the educational needs of the tribes. They maintain that the tribal dweller has a strong suspicion of anything that smacks of Government interference and that he would have nothing to do with publicly-provided education. There is, however, another point of view. The writer and an Iraqi inspector of schools were sitting in a Bedouin guest tent one evening recently, together with two sheikhs, one of whom is reputed to be amassing land for his own purposes and the other who is the more liberal minded son of a sheikh who once established two schools. The following conversation was heard and, for what it is worth, is quoted verbatim:

First sheikh: 'I hear that you have offered to provide a school building if the Government will provide teachers.'

Second sheikh: 'Yes, I would like a school for my son Silah and for the other boys of his age.'

First sheikh: 'If your people become educated they will be demanding more rights. You will be laying up trouble for the future.'

Second sheikh: 'I want my people to be educated so that they may become better human beings. The future is with those who are educated.'

There is, of course, always more than one point of view about educational matters. The point of view of the second sheikh is expressed in another way by an Iraqi educator who writes, 'The problem which the Iraq Government faces as regards the tribes, the solution of which should form one of the main civic aims of education in Iraq, is the broadening of the outlook and allegiance of the tribesmen from their narrow tribal limits to a national horizon'.

000 These then, are some of the economic, political and social problems which must be taken into consideration before any ambitious advance in the direction of compulsory education can be contemplated. It is only against this background that the realism of possible solutions to present educational difficulties can be judged. But these problems are not new and, despite the obstacles which they constitute, definite quantitative progress in the field of primary education has undoubtedly been achieved in recent years.

The next step must be to consider the practicability of making

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHl Iraq MHl

by October, 1916, when Mr. Dobbs was invalided to India, a working administrative machinery had been set up, not only for revenue but also for other branches of administration which had been taken under the wing of the Revenue Department. A certain amount of confidence in the British regime had been gained. Data and information on revenue, land tenure and other subjects had been embodied for future guidance in a series of notes which for clarity of judgment and succinctness have probably never been surpassed in the history of 'Iraq Administration.

Administration of Tribal Areas

To the establishment of a government for the tribal areas, both Sir Percy Cox and Mr. Dobbs gave particular attention. The greatest need of the moment was for peace and order in tribal areas and for the restriction of all assistance to the Turks from the Arabs, in order that the Expeditionary Force might devote itself to its main objective of defeating the Turks.

Both Sir Percy Cox and Mr. Dobbs believed that these conditions might be attained by making use of the natural leaders of the tribes: the shaikhs. The alternative of direct government, either by a British or Arab staff, was calculated to be contrary to immediate ends if not impossible, due to the lack of a suitable staff and to the semi-barbaric character of the tribes. Their efforts were, therefore, directed towards building up forms of administration and of justice which, while conforming as far as possible to Western standards, were based on tribal organization, on recognition of tribal habits and customs and on support of the shaikhs as instruments of government.

The policy adopted was, in reality, an adaptation of the system so successfully developed and applied in Baluchistan by Sir Robert Sandeman, of whom it has been said: 'Every great

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colonial administrator has, wittingly or unwittingly, taken him as their example or followed in his footsteps.'[1]

When Sir Robert Sandeman first began to develop his system in Baluchistan, about 1875, he had found 'the tribal organization in a state of rapid decay and the power and influence of the tribal leaders much diminished'.[2] In 'Iraq, at the outbreak of the war, the tribes, especially those on the lower Euphrates, were in much the same state as a result of Ottoman attempts alternately to crush or settle them and to break or conciliate their leaders. The Turkish Government had at all times regarded the tribal Arabs as savages who, from sheer maliciousness, opposed the Government while in reality they were primitive communities still leading an existence so untouched by the benefits of civilized government that they could comprehend no other form of life than that postulated by their own codes and customs. The Government policy until the appointment of Midhat Pasha as *Wali* of Baghdad in 1869 aimed at the forcible conversion of the tribesmen from outlaws to obedient citizens without providing the means to live as such, or without arousing even a spark of the respect by which tribal obedience might be secured.

Midhat Pasha[3] approached the tribal problem from the standpoint of the land. His method was to sell *mīrī* or state lands for small periodical payments, giving *mīrī tāpū sanads* (state-land title-deeds) which, while not conferring actual ownership, gave security of tenure. These *tāpū sanads* were to be open to holders of doubtful titles, to villagers who cleaned a canal or planted a garden and to all shaikhs of tribes for their

[1] Bruce, Col. C. E., *J.R.C. Asian Soc.*, January, 1932, p. 60. For details of Sir Robert Sandeman and his system, see the article cited; Thornton, T. H., *Sir R. Sandeman; his Life* (1895); Hittu Ram, *Sandeman in Baluchistan* (Calcutta, 1916); *The Times*, February 26th, 1935; and *J.R.C. Asian Soc.*, April, 1935.

[2] *J.R.C. Asian Soc.*, January, 1932, p. 51.

[3] For the career of this noted Turkish official, whose reforming influence extended throughout the Ottoman Empire, and to whom the Turkish Constitution of 1878 owed much, see the interesting but uncritical *Life of Midhat Pasha* (1903), by his son, 'Alī Haydar Midhat.

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tribal area. He intended thereby to reclaim wide tracts for the plough, to increase revenue and to subdue tribal 'Iraq by giving the tribesmen new interests and relations in agricultural life. The shaikhs, to whom the grants were to be made, would be won to the government in self-interest, and would therefore lose their terror as rallying-points of anti-government forces. As chiefs of agricultural communities, they would be accessible because rooted to the land, taxable because crops could not be hidden, vulnerable because of government control of water, and dependent on the government as guarantor of their acquired rights to collect the landlord's share of crops.

This agrarian policy, although the only one which could permanently solve the tribal problem, never achieved more than partial success, either during Midhat Pasha's regime, 1869-72, or during those of his successors previous to 1908, who, while nominally committed to land settlement, followed their own devices in dealing with the tribes.[1] The machinery for registering the land was inadequate and tended to become corrupt. The majority of the tribal leaders feared the new policy and shunned the new status as a machination of government to rob them of freedom and to impose conscription. Urban speculators, friendly with *tāpū* officers, forestalled other would-be tribal purchasers.[2]

The attempt to settle the tribes had one definite result. It split the shaikhs as in the case of the Sa'dūns of the Muntafiq into groups, one hostile to the innovations, the other, willing tools of the Government, bought by gifts of land. Between the two groups the Government vacillated. It was easier at times to acquiesce in the domination of the countryside by powerful, reactionary shaikhs and in the consequent nullification of their

[1] After the revolution of 1908, the Young Turks reaffirmed the policy of settling such tribes as were still nomad, such as the *firmān* appointing Jamal Bey (better known as Djemal Pasha) as *Wali* of Baghdad, August, 1911: 'The *Wali* is to formulate a scheme with the least possible delay for the settlement of the nomad tribes on the land.'

[2] *Revenue Circulars*, Nos. 1-22 (Baghdad, 1920), No. 15, p. 25.

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land policy rather than to maintain its own partisans. Whatever plan for winning over the shaikhs had existed, it was soon abandoned by the Young Turks who, desiring to stamp out all other power than their own, sought to establish direct relations between the Government and tribesmen. Great shaikhs were struck down wherever possible, as was Sa'dūn Pasha in June, 1911, when he was treacherously captured and imprisoned in Aleppo where he died suddenly. The authorities went deliberately 'out of their way to break the power of the individual shaikhs by multiplying their number everywhere to a bewildering degree. Anarchy reigned and nothing could be done to prevent it, owing to the lack of a strong hand in each tribe'.[1]

The struggle between the Government and the tribes in the lower Euphrates valley had been further complicated by the disruption of the prevailing feudal system, through the unskilful application to the Muntafiq country of Midhat Pasha's otherwise sound policy of land-settlement.[2] The whole of the arable land, although occupied and cultivated for many years by the tribes and therefore claimed as their own by prescriptive right, was parcelled out between the Turkish crown and the Sa'dūns, *tāpū* title deeds being issued to the new landlords.[3] The degradation in status of the tribesmen to tenants, much as the Irish cultivators had been reduced on their own tribal lands by the English adventurers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, together with the necessity of paying both rent to the newly created Sa'dūn landlords — who formerly had exercised only a form of lordship over the Muntafiq and had held none of the land as private property[4] — and revenue to the Government in the form of shares of their crops, stirred tribal feeling to revolt

[1] *Admin. Report, Suq esh-Shuyukh*, in *P.O. Reports*, 1916-1917.

[2] Nāsir Pasha, the great Sa'dūn and founder of Nāsiriya is credited with introducing the *tāpū* system into the Muntafiq, whereby the Sa'dūns became great landlords. Note on the Sa'dun Problem (confidential) by the Revenue Commissioner, 1916; *Admin. Report of the Muntafiq Division*, 1919 (Baghdad, 1920), pp. 1-2.

[3] Note on the Sa'dun Problem; *Admin. Report, Muntafiq*, 1919, p. 2.

[4] Ibid., also *Revenue Rep.*, 1919, p. 24.

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in which they were joined by the party of landless Sa'dūn hostile to the Government.[1] An era of bitter strife ensued between tribesmen and landlords, many of whom lived in the towns, occasionally by choice but more often by necessity, and between tribesmen and the Government. In some areas, accessible to gunboats and troops, the tribesmen had begun to pay these dues regularly[2] until the weakening of the Government hold, due to the Revolution of 1908 and later to the Italian and Balkan wars. The tribes soon relapsed into their former state of truculence, expelling their landlords and paying scant attention to the Government.[3] In other districts revenue had not been paid by the tribes for years, as in the Hammār Lake area,[4] and in the Sūq ash-Shuyūkh region which had been free of any government control for fifteen years or more.[5] In still others the Turkish writ did not run outside the towns.[6]

Thus, by the time that British Administrators appeared in the tribal areas, the only attempt to settle the tribes had failed for want of will and of means to execute it. Disputes over land and water had embittered relations between tribesmen and landlords on the one hand, and between tribesmen and the Government on the other. The authority of the shaikhs, where it had not been entirely destroyed by the Government, was antagonistic to it. Government had for the most part broken down. 'Iraq, in the words of one competent observer, which though written with reference to the situation in 1900, may be applied with equal force to that in 1914, was

[1] *Revenue Circular No.* 15, p. 25; *Admin. Report, Muntafiq*, 1919, p. 2.
[2] *Review of Civil Admin. of the Occupied Territories of al-'Iraq*, 1914-1918 (Baghdad, 1918), p. 44 (hereafter *Review C. Admin. O.T.*, 1914-1918).
[3] The disturbances eventually led the Turkish Government in 1911, to appoint a Commission of Inquiry, which 'attributed the Muntafiq troubles to the fact that the arable lands of the tribes are in the hands of a few powerful shaikhs who oppress their fellow tribesmen and keep them at variance ... The proper remedy is a thorough partition of the lands'. Cited: Note on Sa'dun Problem.
[4] *P.O. Reports*, 1916-1917; *Admin. Report Hammar Lake Area*, p. 56.
[5] Ibid., *Admin. Report, Suq esh-Shuyukh*, p. 39.
[6] *Arab of Mesopotamia* (Basra, 1917). Hereafter this semi-official publication by Miss G. L. Bell: Bell, *Arab of Meso.*

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> a country of tribesmen fast losing the old loyalties, less and less able to revert to the old livelihood, attracting local rather than tribal relations, more dependent on order and control . . . yet still tribal in material equipment, in speech, in ignorance, still easily inflamed to ruin their own interests, still resentful of government and all its works.[1]

The full application of the policy of rebuilding the tribal organization under competent shaikhs, advised, controlled and supervised by British Political Officers, which was the essence of Sandeman's policy, had to wait until the force of Turkish arms had been broken.[2] In the meantime, however, every means of strengthening the power of the shaikhs was undertaken, on the basis that 'both the attitude and action of a tribe depend almost entirely on its most influential chiefs'.[3]

[622] A single leading shaikh was recognized in every tribe, as in the Sūq ash-Shuyūkh district where H. R. P. Dickson, Assistant Political Officer, reported that he had 'managed during 1916-17, more or less to get the power into the hands of one shaikh in the case of each of the 22 Suq tribes'.[4]

Each shaikh so selected was made responsible for peace and order in his tribe, for the apprehension of wrongdoers, for the protection of lines of communication and of British Government property, for the cutting off of supplies and aid to the Turks and for the collection of such revenue as was levied. In return, he was given the support of British officials, prestige and, if necessary, arms. Possession of his lands was confirmed, and his tribal boundaries were defined as closely as possible. His natural importance in the tribal *majlis* was enhanced by

[1] Longrigg, S. H., *Four Centuries of Modern 'Iraq*, p. 309.

[2] For instance, Nāsirīya was occupied July, 1915, but not until 1918 was administrative progress possible among the tribes, because of their anti-British feeling. *Admin. Report, Muntafiq*, 1919, p. 2; *Revenue Report*, 1919, p. 24.

[3] *Provisional Note on the Tribes within and fringing Mesopotamian Boundaries, North of Latitude* 33° 20′ (*Baghdad*). For official use only, General Staff, M.E.F. (Baghdad, 1920), p. 1 (hereafter *Note on Tribes for General Staff*). Although written in 1920 of tribes of Baghdad wilayet, it is generally applicable to practically all tribes from 1914.

[4] *P.O. Reports*, 1916-1917: *Admin. Rep., Sūq esh-Shuyukh*, p. 43.

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the measures of the Tribal Disputes Regulations. Added to these was the policy of 'large doles, subsidies and no taxation',[1] which one Political Officer, at Nāsirīya, held to be 'chiefly responsible for the remarkable state of law and order which now exists', since 'the shaikh . . . will obey any order than risk losing it (his subsidy)'.[2]

As advantageous for immediate military ends as was the policy of restoring the cohesion of the tribes and the patriarchal rule of their shaikhs and as well suited as it was to many aspects of tribal life, it was nevertheless fraught with difficulties for the future.

The tribal organization had so far deteriorated, especially among the rice-growing and date-producing tribes, that it could only be restored by supporting the shaikhs with force, and, as Sir Henry Dobbs said in 1916: 'Once a shaikh has to rely on Government for support, he has lost the sympathy of his tribesmen.'[3] Endowed with power as they were and motivated by self-interest no less than the meanest tribesmen, the shaikhs found it difficult to restrain themselves from even petty tyrannies, which, by 1920 had assumed such proportions in tribal eyes as to form a cause of the insurrection of that year.

From the standpoint of government, the efforts to restore tribal organization meant the reimposition of feudalism, contrary to the principle of the evolution of political institutions. Purely bureaucratic government, with its lack of flexibility and sympathetic contacts, was manifestly unsuited to tribes at the time, a fact which Mr. Dobbs realized and made every effort to combat. Nevertheless, the introduction of the Sandeman system, depending for its successful operation on maintenance of the tribal *status quo*, gave little opportunity for the operation of civilizing processes, for the growth of less primitive social codes and of more progressive forms of government. The system in 'Iraq tended to become a method of control rather than a system of government in its broadest sense.

[1] *Admin. Report, Muntafiq*, 1921 (confidential, Baghdad, 1922), p. 18.
[2] *Reports Admin.*, 1918: *Nasiriyah Division*, p. 351.
[3] Cited, *Admin. Report, Suq al-Shuyukh District*, in *Admin. Report, Muntafiq*, 1921, p. 56.

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[following p. 96(a)]

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[following p. 96(b)]

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Shī'is of the Holy Cities and of the tribes of the Euphrates Valley maintain, in substantiation of their claims to a greater share in the Government of 'Iraq,[1] that it was they who brought about the Insurrection of 1920 and, therefore, brought independence to 'Iraq. It was also doubtful for a time whether the Movement would degenerate into a localized *Jihād*, such as actually occurred in the Muntafiq in 1920, or whether it would pave the way for the creation of an Arab state under a Hāshimī ruler as the political leaders desired.

To the tribes, as the most powerful single weapon at their disposal, the Nationalist leaders paid particular attention, although they, as townsmen, normally feared the tribesmen as much as they professed to despise them as uncivilized. The tribes, north of Najaf, along the Euphrates and in the Jazīra, being more accessible to Damascus and Aleppo, were susceptible to Sharifian propaganda emanating from those centres. Among the tribes of the Middle and Lower Euphrates, predominantly Shī'a, the Nationalists from the Holy Cities and Baghdad found the most fertile ground for their politico-religious propaganda, although the Banī Tamīm, the 'Azza and other tribes between Baghdad and Ba'qūbā were not unaffected.

Normally inter-tribal and inter-sectional politics dictate tribal attitude and behaviour. Concerted action among the tribes becomes possible only when they are moved by an idea or motive transcending their local and sectional interests, a rare occurrence. The 'Iraq tribes had not been untouched by pre-war National aspirations, which had, in fact, accentuated tribal antipathy to the Turks,[2] but a feeling of national consciousness had never taken firm hold among them or become a compelling motive of action. It is unlikely that Nationalist propaganda spread by Sharifian agents or from Shī'a centres would have taken root in tribal minds had it not been for the

[1] As in the tribal risings of the spring of 1935. See an illuminating article, MacDonald, A. D., *J. R. C. Asian Soc.*, Vol. XXIII (1936), Pt. 1, pp. 27 ff.

[2] *Note on Tribes for General Staff*, p. 3.

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fact that the propagandists concentrated strongly and persuasively on matters nearer to their hearts and to their personal advantage than the abstract concept of a national existence.

National independence thus became attractive to the tribes not because of any theory of indigenous administration or any hope of an Islamic state,[1] but because it promised an escape from Government, particularly one insistent on the payment of taxes. Their concept of the ideal government was one with bread in one hand and a club in the other: that is to say, dispensing benefits for which they were not called upon to pay, and maintaining a strong justice with impartiality. The Turks had in no way lived up to this conception. The British Administration at its inception had been promising, but it had gradually lost its ideal character. Tribal districts were now forced to pay revenue such as they had never paid before[2] and as they were never to pay again.[3] In the Muntafiq, for instance, the collection of revenue per capita had increased from less than one-fifth of a rupee (As.2 Ps.10 or 3d.) in 1916[4] to Rs.5 As. 10 in 1919 (about 8s. 6d. in sterling). It fell again to Rs.1 As.4 (about 1s. 11d.) in 1922,[5] rising to Rs.4 As.5 (6s. 6d.) in 1929, above which it has never risen. Nor did the tribesmen see

[1] *Admin. Report Muntafiq*, 1920, p. 4; ibid., 1921, p. 5.

[2] *Supra*, pp. 118, 145. The Bani Hûchaim paid heavy taxation for the first time in their history in 1919: *Admin. Report, Diwaniyah Division*, 1919 (Baghdad, 1920), p. 1.

[3] The collection of Revenue in the Muntafiq, 1916 to 1928 was:

1916	Rs. 52,464 (*)	Only Nâsiriya and Sûq ash-Shuyûkh districts occupied.
1919	16,61,823 (*)	
1922	3,68,508 (†)	April 1st, 1922, to February 1st, 1923.
1926	10,02,659 (‡)	
1928	12,77,233 (§)	The peak year before fall in prices.

(*) *Admin. Report Muntafiq*, 1921, p. 31; (†) *Report of the Accountant-General*, 1922-23 (Baghdad, 1924), pp. 11-12; (‡) *Report on the Operations of the Revenue Department, Ministry of Finance*, 1926-27 (Baghdad, 1927), p. 23; (§) Ibid., 1928-29 (Baghdad, 1929), p. 32.

[4] Based on a population of 295,537, the average of the estimate 320,000 in 1918-19 and that of 271,074, made in 1930-1 for the League of Nations. Ditchburn in *Admin. Report, Muntafiq*, 1920, p. 1, estimated the Muntafiq population at 300,000.

[5] April 1st, 1922, to February 1st, 1923.

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benefits flowing directly to their districts in proportion to the taxation. The receipts for the great tribal Divisions of Muntafiq, Dīwānīya and Shāmīya in 1920 were estimated at Rs.55,33,100 or nearly one-quarter of the total local revenue of the fourteen divisions.[1] The purely divisional expenditures in the three divisions were Rs.19,29,440 or 18·8 per cent of the total divisional expenditure.[2]

Another grievance dominated tribal feeling. The tribal policy adopted by the British authorities in 1915-16 for restoring the power of the shaikhs, largely for military reasons, had been extremely valuable but it had been carried beyond its original and logical conclusions. It had carried with it the necessity of supporting the paramount shaikh in all but the most flagrant uses of his power. Events had proved, however, that these shaikhs had abused their authority, using it for their personal aggrandizement. The other shaikhs and tribesmen, sullen and resentful of the growing autocracy of the Government shaikhs, found in Nationalism a promise of release both from the shaikhs and from the Government which supported them.[3] It is a fact that in the Insurrection of 1920 the enmity of the insurgent shaikhs and tribesmen in many centres was directed less against the British, in spite of Shī'a incitement, than at the paramount Government shaikhs[4] who, in many cases, were forced into the towns from which they dared not stir. In this atmosphere the exhortations of the religious firebrands to rise, slay and loot produced results far greater than the intrinsic merit of their Nationalist propaganda would justify.

Nevertheless, in spite of the undeniable power of fanatical religion among the turbulent tribesmen and in spite of the tribal grievances and hatreds which both Shī'a and Sharifian

[1] *Budget Estimates*, 1920-1921, p. iv.
[2] Ibid., p. v.
[3] *Review C. Admin.*, 1914-1920, p. 143. But cf. *Admin. Report, Muntafiq*, 1921, pp. 2-3.
[4] Ibid., p. 9 (78); Shelswell, G. H., A.P.O. Samāwa: *Official Report on the Causes of the Tribal Disturbances in the Samāwah District*, August 9th, 1920.

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175* 186 628 619 propaganda fused into action, it was not until the rumours of a weakening government seemed to be borne out by its inability to control the situation, that the tribes were emboldened to rise. To the tribal mind, it would have then been a mistake not to have struck when there was a likelihood of the British being overwhelmed and folly to have supported the regime if it were falling. Until that time, however, little evidence of tribal disaffection was apparent. Thus, when reviewing the local political situation in 1919, the Political Officer of Hilla Division reported that a mild form of unrest, connected with the anti-British propaganda emanating from Karbalā, had passed over his Division. It had manifested itself in lawlessness, in murders, attacks on pilgrims and by desertion of Levies with rifles, but prompt action such as the deportation of the ringleaders, the operations of gunboats and the imposition of fines had brought peace.[1] He believed little genuine anti-British feeling existed, except at the Holy City. He warned the Civil Administration, however, that the 'whole series of episodes is instructive of what may recur any time until the future of 'Iraq is definitely announced'.[2] In Diwānīya, Major C. K. Daly, the Political Officer, reported that an undercurrent of Sharifian propaganda had blown through the Division without leaving any appreciable effect,[3] but that the natural lawlessness and truculence of the Samāwa and Rumaitha tribes were causing difficulties in administration.[4] In the Shāmīya Division, in which Najaf was located, the annual report stated that while the religious authorities had co-operated thus far with the Government, the tribes obviously were 'marking time' with an eye on the future, and that they would act accordingly as the Government seemed strong enough to reach them.[5] In the Muntafiq, the influence of propaganda aided by Sharifian gold[6] had made itself felt. Certain of the

[1] *Admin. Report, Hillah Division*, 1919 (Baghdad, 1920), p. 1.
[2] *Monthly Reports, August*, 1919, Hilla, p. 22.
[3] Ibid., Diwānīya, p. 25.
[4] *Admin. Report, Diwaniyah*, 1919, p. 1.
[5] Ibid., *Shamiyah Division* 1919 (Baghdad, 1920), p. 1.
[6] Ibid., *Muntafiq*, 1920.

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Political Officers, however, believed that the Sharifian influence would have little effect in the Muntafiq because of the self-interests of the *fallahīn* and *sarkals*. The Officers stated, however, that it would take low taxation and firm treatment to ensure the maintenance of these friendly relations, the Muntafiq Arabs being like gunpowder: the slightest spark would send them off. The tribes were reported as being quiet at that moment, but with arms at hand, their towers still standing and with a consciousness of their fighting ability, they were dangerous potentialities. They could be persuaded to do almost anything by agitators with a free hand and plenty of money.[1]

Opposed to the British for entirely different reasons but nevertheless joining actively in the agitation against them were the many ex-officials of the former regime repatriated in 'Iraq. Some of these, discontented with the pensions paid them from the Civil Treasury, favoured any regime which would give them employment. Most of them, however, hated Great Britain and sought the return of the Turks or else desired a Muslim Government joined to a pan-Islamic Federation headed by Turkey.

The Nationalists could also count upon the support of many of the landlord class who, accustomed under the Turkish regime to exercise their privilege of collecting their rent to the last piastre without obligation either to the land or tenant, now found a strong arm imposed between them and the *fallahīn*. Tenants, also, who had managed by devious means to escape payment of rent, had little reason to wish for the continuance of a Government which insisted on the payment of rent as well as of revenue. To them, as well as to many other classes, the insistence of the British Administration on its standards of justice, order, punctuality, the conduct of public business and sanitation, had little counterpart in their customs and in their habits of thought. Its unrelenting efficiency and thoroughness and even

[1] Shatra District Report in *Admin. Report, Muntafiq Division*, 1919 (Baghdad, 1920), p. 92.

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that eventually all cases involving Religious Law will be heard in the Civil Courts, along the lines of the Judicial system in force in present-day Turkey. Steps towards that end have been the appointment wherever possible of Civil Judges to act also as *Qādhīs* of the *Shara'* Courts,[1] and the passing of a law legalizing the transfer of law cases from *Shara'* Courts to Civil Courts. These steps have been facilitated both by the ability of the 'Iraqī Civil Judges to administer the *Shara'* Law and by the evident approval of a substantial portion of the public who have found in Turkey, both past and present, the model for 'Iraqī statecraft.

In the administration of justice in tribal areas, the application of the Tribal Criminal and Civil Disputes Regulations[2] has continued but with much controversy. On the one hand, it has been held that the tribes represent a class unfamiliar with the laws and conventions applicable in a more highly civilized society, but possessing a code which, although harsh and even repellent, is definite and is recognized among themselves. The code, according to this view, should be applied to the tribes through the Tribal Disputes Regulations until such time as the normal system of justice can be brought into force among them. This has been the viewpoint of the Ministry of Interior charged with administering the Regulations. On the other hand, it is contended that two systems of justice should not exist side by side in 'Iraq; that much evasion of justice has already occurred through non-tribesmen claiming the right to be tried under the Regulations; and that tribesmen must be assimilated by the body politic. This opinion, although it may not be put forward officially by the Ministry of Justice, has nevertheless influenced the policy of responsible 'Iraqī officials in the Ministry. It has also been repeatedly presented in the Chamber, principally by urban deputies who in their speeches have voiced the prejudices of the greater part of the townsmen of 'Iraq.

[1] In 1931, Civil Court Judges were also *Shara' Qādhis* in 24 places.
[2] As amended, December 28th, 1924. See *Compilation*, 1924, p. 63.

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671 There can be no escape from the fact that the Regulations
619 have been open to abuse and that revolting crimes have been committed by men who, in spite of their long familiarity with the legal codes, have taken advantage of almost untraceable tribal connections to escape punishment strictly due them.

It would seem, however, that now as in 1932 the Regulations represent the only equitable way of dealing with tribesmen. Reforms are no doubt needed, particularly in the definitions between tribesmen and townsmen, but it would also seem that the tribal viewpoint cannot be changed by the mere application of laws to the tribal areas. Until education, land settlement and a liberal-minded official class have brought greater knowledge and familiarity with the customs and conventions prevailing in the rest of 'Iraq, the extension of the legal system in its entirety will be fraught with injustice and with the gravest political and social dangers.

671 A great portion of the work of drafting and formulating the legislation which fell to the Ministry of Justice arose from the necessity both of filling in the outline set forth in the Constitution and of bringing into existence the special laws which by the express stipulations of that document were to govern the application of the principles contained in it.

Legislation of the first category which, after being drafted in the Ministry, was passed by Parliament, included the *Liwā* and Municipal Administration Laws;[1] the Jewish and Christian Communal Court Laws, cited above; the Currency Law;[2] and a series of Regulations for the various Ministries, as well as a number of other laws which put form and substance on the skeleton of the Constitution. Legislation implementing provisions of the Constitution included the Judges and *Qādhīs* Law;[3] Employment of Foreigners Law;[4] a Law for determining

[1] *Compilation*, 1927, *Liwā* Administration Law, No. 58 of 1927; ibid., 1931 Municipalities Administration Law, No. 84 of 1931.
[2] Ibid., 1931, 'Iraq Currency Law, No. 44 of 1931.
[3] Ibid., 1929, No. 31 of 1929. [4] Ibid., 1927, No. 36 of 1927.

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Shia tribes sent less and less of their men to rally to the Muntafiq standard, and the tribal cavalry consisted of paid retainers of the ruling house. There were, it is true, occasional differences between the Saaduns and the Turks, as when the powerful Saadun Pasha was at loggerheads with the Wali of Basra.

The Confederation is a thing of the past, and its Shia tribesmen now owe loyalty only to their own tribal sheikhs, and above them to the Government of Iraq. It is touching to find in some remote reed hut carefully tended pictures of King Feisal and of His Royal Highness the Regent. The tribes had their greatest glory in the days when the country was under foreign domination, when they were the rallying-points of the resistance which prevented the absorption of Iraq into either Turkey or Persia. In a democratic state the position of the tribes is less clear. There is much that is fine in tribal life and worth preserving at all costs, and a tribal loyalty need not necessarily interfere with modern progress. For example, numbers of tribesmen from all over Iraq now live in the capital, working in various jobs, as artisans and labourers, lawyers, doctors and engineers. In this growing State a boy may be born in a tribal reed hut, and if intelligent finish up as a doctor in Baghdad. All these emigrants from the tribes maintain close contact with their tribes, usually by way of entertaining tribesmen on their visits to the city. When a sheikh makes a levy, for some purpose, of a dirhem from the head of every family in his tribe, the emigrants are the first to send in their money: though they may be wealthy doctors driving American saloon cars, they send in the exact dirhem along with the labourers and artisans. To send more would savour of ostentation.

Life in the tribes is changing year by year. The pumping

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1. The Story of Hajji Ali, the Great Sultan and his Son, the Amir Kheyyun

The Maadan. Page 12, Line 17. 'The Maadan shall bring milk.'

The Maadan are in the main a tribe of poor families, living in scattered communities on the shores of that great area of marsh and lake which lies between the Tigris and the Euphrates before the two rivers finally join to form the Shatt el Arab. Maadan villages often acknowledge the authority of sheikhs of neighbouring tribes, and they have no great tradition of their own. Their chief source of wealth was in the past their large herds of water buffaloes, their income being derived from the sale of milk and its products, lebn (a kind of curd), and clarified cooking butter. The sale of milk is regarded as shameful by most tribes, though of course all produce enough for their own requirements. In consequence the Maadan, with their trade in milk and hides, are looked down on by the tribes, and they are said to be lacking in honour. However in the last twenty-five years the Maadan have acquired large areas of agricultural land, and they are sharing fully in the increasing wealth of South Iraq. As for their honour, I remember a fight three years ago which took place between two Maadan subsections not far from Qarmat Ali, just outside Basra. This was a fight for a woman's honour in the best tribal tradition in which nothing was lacking either in the number of rounds of ammunition expended or in the casualties to bring it fully up to the standard of the great tribes in these matters.

2. A Story Concerning the Ignorance of Slaves

Slaves.

'Abd, or slave, is a slang expression in South Iraq for a Negro, and does not now indicate an actual slave. Slavery continued in Iraq to the end of Ottoman rule, 83 years after its abolition in the British Empire. In this story, therefore, the word would refer to actual slaves, and I have so translated it. The word 'habshi' (lit. 'Abyssinian') is little used in South Iraq, a Negro being referred to as a 'sambo' or 'abd'.

Crocodile. Page 20, Line 3. 'In that river was a crocodile.'

The word used was 'timsah', or crocodile, of which of course there are none in Iraq. I do not know if this indicates that this story

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103 Arabic) is sometimes known as Bet al Maqadas, or the Holy House.

Cousin. Page 44, Line 13. 'Has she a cousin?'

582 The right of a man to ask for his cousin in marriage is still main-
178 tained in the tribes. Should the girl or her parents not desire the marriage it may be necessary in some cases to compensate the man for the loss of his right. Family opinion is also a powerful factor tending to
[69] force a man to marry his cousin. In spite of all this, however, the bulk of marriages are between different families, and a surprisingly large number of marriages would appear to be between different tribes. The railway is increasing this tendency, as a man gets employment away from home and frequently marries a girl in the area in which he is working. I remember meeting tribesmen driving lorries in Persia who expressed the desire to take back a Persian wife, but who were anxious about the reception she might meet at their homes. I am told that some did in fact do so, concealing the girls on their lorries when crossing the frontier at Khaniqin.

6. THE STORY OF THE LOST SOUL

Page 60, Line 17. 'A caravan from Persia carrying bodies for burial.'

764 The majority of Persians are of the Shia section of Islam, so wealthy
788 families send their dead to Iraq for burial. The usual custom is for families to come on pilgrimage to the cities of Kerbala, Nejf, and Kadhimain, and to bring the body for burial at the same time. This is many months after the time of death, for Iraqi health regulations now ban the import of recently dead corpses. The body is therefore buried in Persia near to the place of death and dug up when in condition to travel. It is no uncommon thing in a Persian graveyard to see a wooden stretcher lying on top of a tomb to indicate that the family intend to send the body for bur...l in holier soil, though it appears that poverty or forgetfulness after the passage of months often interfere with the actual journey. However, the sight of Persian pilgrims putting a coffin on to the train at Maqil Railway Station is not an uncommon one. Should the family themselves not be able to travel they might have to rely on agents, but it would be the duty of the dead man's eldest son to go with the body if unavoidable circumstances, such as military service or the lack of a passport, did not make it impossible.

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192 crept up to the guard tent. One of the brothers slit the tent wall with
539 his knife and crept inside. Inside the tent he found a box of silver dollars, and he was passing it out through the slit in the tent to his two brothers when he trod on one of the Turks, who woke up and grabbed him by the legs. The Turk was shouting to raise the alarm, and the Nejafi, seeing that he could not get away, and fearing that if he was identified, his whole family would be punished, put his head out through the slit in the tent and implored his brothers to cut it off and take it away. This, according to the story, they did, getting away both with the chest of silver and their brother's head, the identity of the family remaining undiscovered. The word for 'cut' in Arabic does imply cutting off and removing when applied to heads.

10. The Story of the Son of the Pilgrim

Page 148, Line 7. 'He is one of the Shammar princes from Hail.'

619 The Shammar are mentioned in other stories and a reader may be confused by the different areas from which they appear to come. To write a note on this extensive tribe would require considerable knowledge both of Syria and of Saoudi Arabia, and I myself cannot do it. The Shammar best known to the Muntafiq tribes are the Shammar of Nejd, who send caravans legally to Zobeir, and with less authority to other areas. Some of the Nejdi Shammar do graze in Iraqi territory and in the Neutral Zones. However, the most famous Shammar of Iraq are those of Mosul Liwa. There are also Shammar, some of whom have adopted the Shia religion, living in Baghdad Liwa. Many of them have entered Iraq as refugees after defeat by Ibn Saoud. When a prince of the Shammar from Hail is mentioned, I should think that a member of the Rashid family is indicated. This family were once rulers in Nejd, and their capital was for a time at Hail. They were finally defeated by the Wahabis under Ibn Saoud. The word Amir which I have here translated as prince, is a somewhat deceptive one.
[601] The sons of an Arab king carry, it is true, the title of Amir, but the
192 word has a larger usage. The tribes of Northern Arabia and Syria use it in their sheikhly houses, and in the Persian Gulf the word implies little more than a minor local official. The root of Amir is from the Arabic word for 'command' and is most literally translated in such

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619
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[For information on the customs of the Muntafiq tribes in Iraq, see MI1 Kuwait, 1: Dickson, Category 116, scattered references on pp. 110, 111, 124, 147, 164-171, 179, 191, 375, 421, 443-444, 518, 543, 545-560, 607-608, and 615.]

development of an Iraqi nationalism, regarding all Iraqis without distinction as equal citizens of the State. 641 563

These two tendencies are not necessarily opposed to one another except in their extreme forms. A Pan-Arab would generally concede the value of local feeling provided it is kept in its proper place; an Iraqi nationalist would not oppose Iraq's membership of the Arab League. They differ not in essence so much as in emphasis. This difference, however, is important; and it is clear that the future of the minorities will be greatly affected by which of them prevails. If the exclusive Iraqi nationalism prevails, the way will be open for all minorities to become full citizens, although this will not save them from the necessity of at least some degree of assimilation. If Pan-Arab sentiment prevails, then a serious Kurdish problem may arise; and a Christian problem as well if Pan-Arabism is not dissociated from Islamic feeling. 668

The Kurds: Description

The Kurds form a compact community with a local majority in the north and north-east of Iraq. Most of them are concentrated in the liwas of Mosul, Irbil, Kirkuk, Sulaimania and Diala. The regions which they inhabit are largely mountainous, and a great proportion of them are nomadic or semi-nomadic pastoral tribesmen, pasturing sheep, goats and other animals, moving up the mountains in the summer and down again in the cool weather. Others of them, however, are farmers in the plains and valleys, who cultivate wheat, fruit, rice and tobacco; not all the farmers however are wholly settled, some of them being semi-sedentary. 563 221 [241]

Most of the Kurds are Sunni Moslems, although a minority belong to extreme Shi'i sects. Again, most of them preserve their Kurdish language and customs, although in certain districts they are bi-lingual and a few tribes are in process of being Arabized. Their language is not unified so much as a group of dialects, some of which differ partly from one another. Similarly, they themselves do not form a single community but a group of tribes. Among the wholly settled Kurds the tribal organization is becoming weaker, but in the mountains it is still very strong, and in general it is true to say that tribal loyalty is stronger than any other. The tribesmen, like most mountain peoples, are restless under civil government and positive law. They willingly 563 619 178

20: Hourani S-5 (1945) 1947 M1 Middle East
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563 acknowledge no law except their own customs, and no leadership
619 except that of their chief families, some of which, like the Baban
178 family, were virtually independent princes in Ottoman days.

Tribal feeling is still, as it has always been, stronger than Kurdish national feeling; and the Kurds have never formed a nation, still less a nation-state. In the last generation or so, however, new factors of unity have been arising. One is the growth of a Kurdish town-population. In the past the Kurds tended to leave commercial crafts to Jews and Christians, but now a Kurdish burgeoisie has appeared, in whom tribal loyalties are weaker and national ideals stronger. Another factor is the emergence of a Kurdish intelligentsia. Its education has been mainly non-Kurdish: Turkish in the days of the Ottoman Empire, Arabic and Western in the present generation; in consequence many of the educated Kurds have been assimilated to the Turks or Arabs. The majority, however, have remained Kurds, and have begun to develop a modern Kurdish press and literature, with its centres in Baghdad and Sulaimania. They are in contact with the centres of Kurdish life in Syria, Persia, Turkey and the Armenian Soviet Republic, and are forming and spreading the ideas of Kurdish independence and unity.

The Kurds under the Mandate

648 Before the war of 1914–18, the majority of the Kurds were
563 subject to Ottoman rule. It was natural, therefore, that the Allies should favour the idea of Kurdish autonomy: an ideal embodied in the Treaty of Sèvres (1920), which provided for local autonomy for the Kurds still to be left in Turkey, or, if they themselves desired it, an independent state to include the Kurds of the Mosul Vilayet, of which the disposal was still undecided. The Treaty was never carried out, and was replaced in 1923 by that of Lausanne, which said nothing about a Kurdish State or about autonomy for Turkish Kurdistan. In the meantime, an Iraqi Government under British Mandate had been established, and, as it had been found impossible for economic and other reasons to establish a separate government for the Kurds of the Mosul Vilayet, it had been decided to incorporate them in the unitary State of Iraq. On the whole, the Kurds of the Mosul, Irbil and Kirkuk regions accepted this, but those of Sulaimania did not. In 1922 they revolted under the leadership of Shaikh Mahmud. The revolt was only with difficulty suppressed; and it was not

25: Warriner S-5 (to date) 1948 MI Middle East
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sections or clans, under the direction of the sirkal, the head of the clan, who organized the members of the tribe on a share-cropping basis, the peasants generally taking a half, two-fifths, or a third of the produce.

But even on these individual holdings communal ownership is manifested in several ways: for instance by the fact that sub-tribal chiefs can be shifted from their holdings by the tribal chiefs; by the right of pre-emption and veto exercised by the tribe over transfer of land from one member to another, and especially to outsiders; the fact that women are excluded from inheriting land; the moral duty of employing members of the tribe in preference to outsiders; and in certain parts of the country, reallotment of the land on the *mushaa* system.[1]

The method of farming necessitates the existence of some measure of communal cultivation and ownership. Cultivation by irrigation involves many duties which cannot be performed by one household—the clearance of canals, the building of dams across channels, and the strengthening of the river banks; all these functions require tribal organization. Hence the head of the clan, the sirkal, was originally a manager on behalf of the tribe; he employed the peasants and divided the land among them into plots to support them until the harvest, appointed the dates of sowing, harvesting, and threshing, and organized irrigation and canal clearance.

Thus, although the tribe exercises a right of occupancy over the tribal *dirah* and can prove occupation of the whole area, it cannot be proved in the same sense that the peasant has a certain plot of his own occupied for a number of years. Within the tribal *dirah*, the area cultivated by each group shifts as canals silt up and the land is impoverished by salt, and so the area cultivated by each peasant shifts also. The peasants themselves are largely mobile, both within the tribal *dirah* and outside it; cultivation is rather half-hearted and grazing remains an alternative occupation.

It must be remembered that the tribal system, when it prevailed generally, had no legal basis, and no protection from the State; the tribe was, in fact, in itself a unit of political organization, and itself performed the State's functions. Within the

[1] From an unpublished report by Dr Salih Haider, on 'The Problem of the Land in Iraq' (1944).

423 tribal organization there was no clear definition of individual
619 rights of ownership to the collectively-owned land. It was a system which could exist as long as no one thought about it; as long, that is, as the tribe was accepted as the unit of political life, and as long as no individual claims were likely to be made. It is for this reason that it is impossible, once the tribal system has ceased to be the political unit, to settle land on a tribal basis; and yet to settle land on the basis of the supposed individual claims creates grave injustice, because in practice it means that too much land is allotted to the sheikhs and that the cultivators are reduced to the position of tenants or labourers.

439 Since the early years of the twentieth century the tribal system has been breaking up, and the economic development of the country in the twenty years between the wars has hastened its disintegration. When water transport came to the Persian Gulf towards the end of the nineteenth century, export markets opened for Iraq grain; the subsistence economy broke down and production for export began. Exports of grain increased from 65,000 tons in the early eighteen-nineties to 120,000 tons in 1909–13, and to 380,000 tons in 1934–9. The profitability of
556 export has given the tribal chiefs a motive for acquiring land as their personal property.

The tendency to acquire land for the sake of money income was much strengthened, in the twenty years between the two wars, by the rapid extension of pump irrigation and the accompanying increase in the cultivated area. Pump installations
312 have increased from 143 in 1921 to 3,000 in 1944, and provide
426 water for some 2½ million acres of land, or over half the cultivated land in the irrigated zone. The installation of a pumping system is comparatively cheap, costing some £2,000 before the recent war, but it is far beyond the means of the peasants, so that pumps have been installed by sheikhs, or more frequently by city notables, who make contracts to supply them to peasants at extortionate rates of interest, and so gradually acquire the land in payment of debt. In many cases the sub-chiefs, or sirkals, have become pump owners.

423 Thus in the regions of pump irrigation the tribal system has
427 entirely ceased to function. The land is mainly the property of the pump owners, with the cultivators taking a meagre share of the crop, varying from one-seventh to one-fourteenth or one-